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Abstract
This thesis contains three chapters that empirically study the impact of risk
on firm level decisions and firms’ ability to share risks with their stakeholders.
The firms that are studied in all three papers are hotels in Austrian ski resorts.
The first chapter provides a comprehensive study of the risk sharing between
Austrian ski hotels and their stakeholders. We obtain two main results. The
first main finding is that the entrepreneurs share snow-induced sales risk with
their workers, while the dividend payments to the entrepreneurs are not af-
fected by these exogenous shocks to firms’ sales. This finding opposes the view
of the entrepreneur as a risk taker. We find that hotels insure their workers
against weather-induced sales shocks only if the shocks are highly temporary
during the winter-season.
The second main result is that entrepreneurs share exogenous sales risk with
their house-banks. The second chapter empirically analyzes interbank lending
using a sample of banks in Austrian ski resorts. The banks are subject to
liquidity shocks due to weather-induced demand shocks in ski tourism. We
analyze the effect of these shocks on interbank lending and borrowing. In our
analysis, we use snow in ski resorts as an instrumental variable for the possibly
endogenous demand shocks. The analysis reveals that banks reduce their net
lending to other banks at times when they need to provide liquidity to their
non-bank customers.
The third chapter empirically studies how small-firm employment respond to
labor productivity risk. We show that this depends on the equity capital of
local banks. We find that an increase in the risk of transitory productivity
shocks reduces firms’ willingness to commit to employing workers. This effect
is stronger if local banks have less equity capital. It appears that a lack of
bank equity reduces firms’ capacity to take labor productivity risk.
I
Zusammenfassung
Diese kumulative Dissertation untersucht in drei Kapiteln den Effekt von
Risiko auf Firmenentscheidungen und die Fähigkeit von Firmen, Risiken mit
ihren Stakeholdern zu teilen. Die betrachteten Firmen sind Skihotels in öster-
reichischen Skigebieten.
Das erste Kapitel ist eine umfassende Studie zur Risikoteilung zwischen Skiho-
tels und ihren Stakeholdern. Es gibt zwei hauptsächliche Ergebnisse. Erstens
wird gezeigt, dass Unternehmer Wetterrisiko mit ihren Arbeitnehmern teilen,
selbst aber kein Wetterrisiko tragen. Dieses Ergebnis ist in Widerspruch zur
Vorstellung des Unternehmers als Risikoträger. Das zweite Ergebnis ist, dass
Firmen Wetterrisiko mit ihrer Hausbank teilen.
Das zweite Kapitel untersucht anhand von Banken in "osterreichischen Skige-
bieten die Rolle des Interbankenmarkt. Die Banken in Skigebieten sind Liq-
uiditätsschocks ausgesetzt, die durch touristisch bedingte Nachfrageschocks
erzeugt werden. Der Effekt dieser Schocks auf die Kredittätigkeit der Banken
ist Gegenstand dieser Studie. Das Ergebnis der Studie ist, dass Banken mehr
Kapital auf dem Interbankenmarkt beschaffen, wenn sie ihren Kunden in der
Realwirtschaft in Folge eines Nachfrageschocks Liquidität gewähren müssen.
Das dritte Kapitel untersucht, wie die Beschäftigungspolitik von kleinen Fir-
men auf Risiko in der Arbeitsproduktivität reagiert. Ein Ergebnis ist, dass
das abhängig ist von der Kapitalisierung des lokalen Bankenmarktes. Es wird
gezeigt, dass eine Zunahme in transitiven Arbeitsproduktivitätsrisiko die Bere-
itschaft der Firmen verringert Arbeitnehmer einzustellen. Dieser Effekt ist
umso stärker, je schlechter lokale Banken kapitalisiert sind. Es scheint, als
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An introductory summary
This thesis contains three papers that empirically study the impact of risk on
firm level decisions and firms’ ability to share risks with their stakeholders. The
firms that are studied in all three papers are hotels in Austrian ski resorts. As
Austrian ski hotels principally are small firms, this thesis adds to the literature
on the risk management of small firms. Small firms are an important part of
the economy as they employ a large fraction of the workforce in the economy
(see U.S. Census Bureau (2015)). In addition, small firms are known to be bad
in managing economic shocks (see Farrell and Wheat (2019)).
The hotels cater to tourists whose demand depends on the snow conditions in
the resorts. Hence, snow represents a source of sales and, therefore, liquidity
for the hotels. However, snow is uncertain and snow risk causes liquidity risk
for the ski hotels. Snow is an exogeneous variable, which is plausibly not
influenced by any firm level variable. Hence, the results in all three papers can
be interpreted as causal effects of risk.
By focusing on snow-induced risk, all three papers in this thesis add to the
literature on the economic adaptation to climate change. One observation of
climate change is that weather risk is increasing over time. The results in this
thesis help to understand the economic consequences of the increase in weather
risk. Ski hotels react to increasing risk by not hiring or firing employees. We
also highlight one channel that modulates this effect: Liquidity provision by
banks. If the banks close to the hotels are poorly capitalized, hotels’ display
even less willingness to hire workers. Thus, the evidence found in this the-
sis suggests that one outcome of climate change is rising unemployment in
industries that depend on weather.
The first paper, “Who bears entrepreneurial risk?”, provides a comprehensive
study of the risk sharing between Austrian ski hotels and their stakeholders.
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The stakeholders that are analyzed are the hotels’ workers, their house-banks,
their suppliers of material inputs and services, and their landlords. Theoret-
ically, workers should be insured by firms against idiosyncratic shocks (see
Knight (1921), Azariadis (1975)). In addition, under certain conditions, firms’
house-banks (see Boot (2000)) and their suppliers (see Petersen and Rajan
(1997)) should be willing to provide liquidity to a firm when it is hit by a
shock. We use the data on Austrian ski hotels to empirically analyze who
bears the snow-induced sales risk. We obtain two main results. The first
main finding is that the entrepreneurs share snow-induced sales risk with their
workers, while the dividend payments to the entrepreneurs are not affected
by these exogenous shocks to firms’ sales. This finding opposes the view of
the entrepreneur as a risk taker suggested by Knight (1921). The risk-sharing
with the workers happens at the extensive margin, i.e. firms hire or fire work-
ers given the sales shocks. We find that hotels insure their workers against
weather-induced sales shocks only if the shocks are highly temporary during
the winter-season. The second main result is that entrepreneurs share exoge-
nous sales risk with their house-banks. The interest payments of the hotels
are lower after the hotel experienced a bad winter. The risk sharing between
the hotels and their house-banks is prevalent only in areas that display high
bank-level competition - a result that is in line with the theory of Boot and
Thakor (2000). We do not find evidence for risk sharing between the hotels
and their other stakeholders, i.e. their suppliers or landlords.
The second paper, “Interbank Lending and Banks’ Supply of Liquidity Insur-
ance to the Real Sector” co-authored with Alex Stomper, empirically analyzes
interbank lending using a sample of banks in Austrian ski resorts. The banks
are subject to liquidity shocks due to weather-induced demand shocks in ski
tourism. We analyze the effect of these shocks on interbank lending and bor-
rowing. In our analysis, we use snow in ski resorts as an instrumental variable
for the possibly endogenous demand shocks. The analysis reveals that banks
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reduce their net lending to other banks at times when they need to provide
liquidity to their non-bank customers. Our evidence adds to the literature
regarding the role of the interbank market in banks’ liquidity creation. It
highlights effects of a specific type of liquidity creation, i.e., the liquidity in-
surance banks provide to the real sector (see Holmstrom and Tirole (1998)).
We find that shocks triggering this insurance reduce banks’ longer-term lend-
ing to other banks, but we find no effects on short-term net lending. Moreover,
we observe particularly strong effects for (i) banks with regionally focused op-
erations, (ii) banks with higher equity ratios, (iii) banks that face relatively
low levels of snow risk, and (iv) banks with a geographically diversified branch
network.
The third paper, “Risk and Employment: Banking on Snow” co-authored
with Thomas Schober, Alex Stomper, and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, empirically
studies how small-firm employment respond to labor productivity risk. We
show that this depends on the equity capital of local banks. The analysis in this
paper tests the foundations of models from the macro-finance literature (see
Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2019) and Quadrini (2017)). In these models firm-
level employment decreases if the volatility of labor productivity increases. Our
analysis is based on a truly quasi-experimental setting. We use highly granular
data about a sample of small firms employing workers whose productivity
depends on the weather. The data allow us to cleanly identify the causal effect
of labor productivity risk on the firms’ employment. We find that an increase in
the risk of transitory productivity shocks reduces firms’ willingness to commit
to employing workers. This effect is stronger if local banks have less equity
capital. It appears that a lack of bank equity reduces firms’ capacity to take
labor productivity risk. Our evidence also highlights that bank capitalization
matters for economic adaptation to climate change by reducing the effects of
increased weather variability on small-firm employment.
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This paper analyzes whether entrepreneurs share sales risk with their
firms’ stakeholders. We study a sample of small, family-owned firms ex-
posed to snow risk as a source of exogenous sales risk: Austrian ski
hotels. Our main finding is that the entrepreneurs share exogenous
sales risk with their workers, while the dividend payments to the en-
trepreneurs are not affected by exogenous shocks to firms’ sales. This
finding opposes the view of the entrepreneur as a risk taker suggested by
Knight (1921). In addition, we find that entrepreneurs share exogenous
sales risk with their house-banks and that this is prevalent only in areas
that display high bank-level competition. Snow risk is a weather risk
and linked to Climate Change. It follows that the findings in this paper
are relevant for policy makers to understand the consequences of climate
change on unemployment and the health of local banking markets.
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1 Introduction
Knight (1921) describes the entrepreneur to be the “confident and venture-
some”, who assumes risk and insures her “doubtful and timid” workforce by
guaranteeing them a stable income and employment. This statement, later
formalized by Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), suggests that entrepreneurs may
have lower degrees of risk aversion than the remaining population. In a Forbes
article, Brown (2013) states a different view on entrepreneurs’ taste for risk.
He claims that entrepreneurs “don’t like risk. They accept it as part of the
game and then work extremely hard to reduce it to a minimum.” His view sug-
gests that entrepreneurship is not caused by the taste for risk but the ability to
manage the exposure towards the risk. It is not necessary that entrepreneurs
and workers have a different degree of risk aversion. The seemingly less risk
averse behavior of entrepreneurs may be explained by superior access to capital
markets. This allows them to better diversify risk than their workers. There-
fore, the entrepreneurs would behave as if they were less risk averse than their
workers.
However, ownership in small, privately held firms is highly concentrated. From
a modern portfolio theory standpoint, entrepreneurs’ portfolios are often not
sufficiently diversified, and entrepreneurs are overly exposed to their firms’
idiosyncratic risk (see Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)). As a result
of their portfolio not being well-diversified, entrepreneurs of small, privately
held firms might have a great distaste for their firms’ risk and thus might try
to share it with other parties.
This leads to the main question addressed in this study: Do entrepreneurs
bear their companies’ risk themselves or can they share it with their stake-
holders? For example, in the model of Herranz, Krasa, and Villamil (2015),
entrepreneurs can manage their personal exposure to their firms’ risk by the use
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of outside capital in the form of bank debt.1 We use risk created by unexpected
annual fluctuations of firms’ sales revenues, and analyze if entrepreneurs’ div-
idend payouts in a given year are sensitive to their firms’ sales revenue in this
year. In addition, we test whether entrepreneurs are able to share risk with
their workers (as opposed to Knight’s view of the entrepreneur), with their
house-banks, or with other stakeholders of their firms, i.e. their suppliers and
their landlords, by adjusting the contemporaneous payments to them after
realizing a sales shock.
We approach the research question by analyzing data on Austrian ski hotels.
The sample choice is motivated by a number of properties of the Austrian ski
hotel industry. Usually, Austrian ski hotels are managed by their owners, i.e.
the entrepreneurs.2 For their owners, the proceeds from the hotel typically
constitute the primary source of income. In this industry, firms do not issue
public debt or equity, hence bank debt is their only source of outside capital
available.
Austrian ski hotels employ a high number of seasonal employees. In a related
study, Baumgartner, Schober, Stomper, and Winter-Ebmer (2020) show that
for the average firm in the Austrian tourism industry, the share of seasonal
employees is about 50% in the peak season. In addition, Austrian ski hotels
are small, i.e. the largest firm in our sample employs less than 200 employees.
Small firms are an important part of the economy, nevertheless their coverage
in research is lower than that for large, publicly traded firms.3 At the same
time, small firms seem to be especially exposed to sales shocks. According to
Farrell and Wheat (2019), half of the small firms in U.S. would not survive
more than two weeks without sales revenues.
1 In the case of a negative shock, the entrepreneur is able to default if optimal for her.
2 According to a study by Doerflinger, Doerflinger, Gavac, and Vogl (2013), 93% of the
firms in the industry are family owned
3 In the U.S., small firms employed 47.5% of the workforce in 2015 (see U.S. Census Bureau
(2015)), and produced 45% of GDP in 2010. (see U.S. Small Business Administration
(2018)).
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Finally, Austrian ski hotels are subject to an exogenous source of risk to their
demand: Weather risk. The demand for ski hotels’ services depends on snow
in a non-linear way. If there is too little snow to do skiing, customers who
haven’t booked will not book nights accommodation and customers who have
already booked will consider canceling their existing bookings.
The number of snow cannons in entire Europe in 2007, one year after the
end of our sample period, accounted for only 15% of the number of snow
cannons in Austria alone only eight years later (see Salzburger Nachrichten
(2015)).4 Hence, snow influences hotels’ sales revenues through the demand
by ski tourists.
We measure the industry wide exposure of ski hotels’ sales to sales risk using a
similar strategy as Stulz and Williamsom (1996). We find that one additional
day of snow increases the sales of the hotels by about 1,700 Euros, which
equals 0.67% of the within standard deviation of hotels’ sales. Moreover, the
effect is mainly triggered by losses in sales during bad winters. The exposure
of Austrian ski hotels to exogenous snow risk allows us to use snow days as an
instrumental variable for firm level sales and identify causal effects.
We find that weather induced sales shocks have no statistically significant effect
on contemporaneous payouts to entrepreneurs, i.e. that the dividends are not
systematically lowered after an exogenous decrease in sales. In addition, we
find that hotels’ workers are not sheltered from weather induced sales risk.
For a one Euro decrease in sales, we observe a 21 cent decrease in the total
wage bill of the hotel. This result is driven by the extensive margin, i.e. hotels
react to negative weather induced sales shocks by firing employees. The finding
that entrepreneurs are not exposed to contemporaneous sales risk themselves
4 To the best of our knowledge, Austrian ski hotels did not hedge snow risk by the use of
derivatives or insurance. Payoffs from weather insurance or derivatives could offset the
snow induced risk borne by the entrepreneur.
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but share it with their employees is surprising, as it opposes the view of the
entrepreneur as a risk-taker by Knight (1921).
Our results on risk sharing between hotels and their house-banks suggest that
hotels are able to share sales risk with their banks by adjusting loan related
payments. The payments to banks are lower after the hotels have realized a
negative sales shock. We do not find that this is caused by the banks forgiving
part of the debt. Instead, we find that hotels seem to be able to adjust or defer
their interest payments. This result is consistent with the results in Giroud,
Mueller, Stomper, and Westerkamp (2011).5 We find that hotels are able to
share both temporary and persistent sales risk with their banks.
We do not find evidence for risk sharing between hotels and their suppliers.
This is not so surprising as we observe risk sharing between hotels and their
banks, and the previous literature on trade credit suggests that suppliers might
take the role of banks whenever the banking sector is underdeveloped (see
Petersen and Rajan (1997)). We do also not find evidence for risk sharing
between hotels and their landlords. This might be due to the reason that the
majority of the hotels in our sample own most of their buildings and rent is
therefore only a small fraction of sales that can be paid easily by the hotels.
We test whether hotels’ risk sharing with their workers and their house banks
depends on the persistence of the sales shock. By nature, snow induced sales
shocks are not persistent from one winter season to another. However, we can
distinguish between persistent and temporary sales shocks within the winter
season. During the starting weeks of the winter season, negative snow shocks
are temporary because additional snow is likely to fall in the following weeks.
In the ending weeks of the winter season, negative snow shocks become per-
manent, as additional snow fall is less probable in the near future.
5 They claim that for hotels which experienced negative demand shocks, debt forgiveness
would constitute a windfall gain.
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We find that firms do insure workers against shocks which are temporary within
the winter season. In contrast, in the end of the season, when negative snow
shocks become persistent for that winter season, workers are not insured. These
two findings are in line with the previous literature (see Guiso, Pistaferri, and
Schivardi (2005), Guertzgen (2014), Ellul, Pagano, and Schivardi (2018)). We
do not find a difference in risk sharing between hotels and their house banks
for temporary and persistent within-season sales shocks. Hotels are able to
share both kinds of shocks with their house-banks. This is not surprising, as
the duration of the lending relationship is very likely to exceed one winter
season and, therefore, persistent within-season sales shocks are still considered
temporary by the hotels’ house-banks. The same statement does not neces-
sarily hold for the hotels’ workforce, given ski hotels employ a high fraction of
seasonal workers.
We perform sample splits to test whether hotels’ risk sharing with their workers
and their house banks is especially pronounced for hotels with certain charac-
teristics. We find risk sharing between firms and their workers at both small
and large firms. Only firms which are not highly indebted are able to share
sales risk with their workforce. We have the following interpretation of this
finding: It is hard for hotels in financial distress to attract seasonal employ-
ees.6 As a result, the hotels in financial distress employ mainly key employees
(probably family members). These employees are not laid off in times of an
adverse shock and they do not extract money from the hotel in times of a
positive sales shock.
Risk sharing between hotels and workers primarily takes place in counties with
high levels of labor market tightness. In these counties, it is relatively easy
for workers to find a new job, hence the provision of employment insurance
in return for a lower wage is not as valuable for these workers as it is for
6 We find those hotels to significantly smaller than the remaining hotels.
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workers in counties which exhibit low labor market tightness. Risk sharing
between hotels and banks does not differ significantly between small and large
hotels. Banks share risk only with hotels which are not in the highest 25%
of the distribution of financial leverage, i.e. not too close to financial distress.
We find that only banks in local banking markets that experience high levels
of bank competition engage in risk-sharing with their borrowers. This result
supports the model of Boot and Thakor (2000) rather than that of Petersen
and Rajan (1995). Boot and Thakor (2000) suggest that relationship lending
activity is higher in competitive banking environments.
We chose to study snow risk not only because it is exogenous but also because
it is increasingly relevant topic. Snow risk is a weather related risk and it is
supposed to increase in the future due to climate change. Other industries,
like agriculture or construction, are also exposed to weather risk. These in-
dustries share some similarities with the Austrian ski hotel industry. They
employ a large number of seasonal employees and the group of small firms
has a significant market share. The results of this study are therefore relevant
understanding and predicting the economic consequences of climate change in
exposed industries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides insights about the Aus-
trian hotel industry. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology and the
hypotheses we test. Section 4 describes the data. Sections 5 presents the
results. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Related literature
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes risk sharing
by firms with their workers and their creditors and their suppliers in one
comprehensive study.
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The paper is related to multiple strands of the literature. First, it is re-
lated to the literature on risk sharing between firms and their employees. The
idea that entrepreneurs insure their workers against risk dates back to Knight
(1921). Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) provide a general equilibrium model, in
which risk aversion determines the decision whether individuals become en-
trepreneurs or workers. Azariadis (1975) proposes a model where risk-neutral
entrepreneurs, in exchange for a lower average wage, provide insurance to risk-
averse workers by sheltering their wages and their employment from firm level
shocks.
The paper which is most closely related to this analysis is the paper by Rettl,
Stomper, and Zechner (2019). Rettl et al. (2019) analyze how industry-wide
and hence systematic risk is shared between firms’ shareholders and their work-
ers in the electricity industry. Their findings are different from the results in
this paper, i.e. that workers’ wage bills are isolated from risk, whereas div-
idend payments to shareholders are not. The authors provide the following
explanation for their results: The firms that are analyzed take the beta of
their owners as given, i.e. the shareholders are not negatively affected by in-
creases in systematic risk by the firm. This argument, however, does only
make sense for large, publicly held firms. For the firms in our sample which
are small and owner-managed, we would expect different results. According to
a survey by Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005), CFOs show strong
preference for dividend stability, even laying off a large portion of workers and
borrowing heavily before cutting dividends. In contrast to the findings in this
paper, Guiso et al. (2005) find that firms insure their workers’ wages against
idiosyncratic shocks in productivity. Their analysis differs from our study in
that they analyze firms that are larger than the firms in our sample. In addi-
tion, the nature of the shock to firm level sales is not clearly idiosyncratic in
our setting since all hotels in the local economy are hit by snow shocks.
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The literature distinguishes temporary and persistent shocks. Similar to the
results in this study, it has been shown that firms provide more insurance
to their workers against temporary shocks than against persistent shocks (see
Gamber (1988), Guiso et al. (2005), Guertzgen (2014), Ellul et al. (2018)). In
contrast to these studies, our research design allows us to use two “natural”
counterparts7 of the rather technical definitions of temporary and persistent
shocks. 8
The degree of insurance differs among different groups of firms. For example,
using an international data set on listed firms, Ellul et al. (2018) show that
family firms do provide more employment insurance to their employees in
return for less wage insurance and a lower average wage. Despite the firms in
our sample most likely being family firms9, we find that firms share risk with
their workforce.
Second, the paper is connected to the literature on relationship lending. In-
formation creation by the repeated lending transactions between the same
bank and borrower combination can help to overcome adverse selection and
moral hazard problems that arise when banks lend to small and information-
ally opaque borrowers (see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Diamond (1984)). Boot
(2000) claims that relationship lending enables the borrower and the lender
to form a long-term implicit contract. This shifts the objective of the house
bank from pure short-term profitability to a more long-term perspective. This
increases the willingness to either renegotiate the terms of a loan or providing
new capital to the borrower when she is in financial trouble due to a tempo-
rary negative shock (see Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1993)). Elsas and
Krahnen (1998) empirically show that house-banks provide liquidity insurance
7 For an explanation of our measures of temporary and persistent shocks, see 3
8 One side result in the related working paper of Baumgartner et al. (2020) is that firms
share contemporaneous snow risk with their employees by adjusting employment as a
result of shocks to snow only in the ending weeks of the winter season, i.e. the period in
which negative shocks to sales become persistent.
9 for a discussion, see section 2.2.
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to their long term customers. As the duration of the lending relationship in-
creases, borrowers face lower interest rates and collateral requirements (Boot
and Thakor (1994)). Therefore, small firms, which are often very opaque, tend
to borrow from a small number of lenders only; and the lending relationship
between them is enduring (see Petersen and Rajan (1994)).
Throughout the lending relation, banks are able to acquire an informational
advantage over competing banks. An advantage that is lost once the borrower
goes into bankruptcy or the borrower enters into lending relationships with
multiple lenders.
Petersen and Rajan (1995) analyze the effect of bank competition on relation-
ship lending. They find that relationship lending is more prevalent in more
concentrated banking markets, since it is less likely that a borrower enters into
multiple lending relationships, i.e. the lender loses her informational advan-
tage. In contrast, Boot and Thakor (2000) demonstrate that banks engage
more in relationship lending activity once competition among banks increases.
The idea is the following: As relationship lending is a specialized service which
helps banks to insulate themselves from pure price competition in the trans-
actions lending market.
Giroud et al. (2011) analyze a related data set: The subset of the customers
of the Austrian Hotel and Tourism Bank (AHTB) which are in financial dis-
tress and undergo debt restructuring. They find that the AHTB grants debt
forgiveness for ski hotels experiencing a debt overhang problem in order to
restore the borrowers’ incentives. In their study they do not find the AHTB
to forgive debt for ski hotels which ended up in financial trouble caused by a
series of negative snow shocks. We find a similar result for debt forgiveness.
In addition, however, we find evidence suggesting that the AHTB is willing to
adjust borrowers’ interest payments as a result of negative snow shocks.
14
Third, the paper is connected to another strand of the literature that analyzes
the role of the firms’ suppliers as suppliers of credit to the firms. Petersen and
Rajan (1997) find that firms use more trade credit when credit from banks is
unavailable. They argue that, similar to relationship lenders, suppliers may
have an comparative advantage in generating private information about the
quality of their borrowers. At the same time, they also hold an implicit equity
stake in their customers, by profiting from potential future sales to them. Sim-
ilar results are found by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) and Fisman
and Love (2003).
2 Institutional background
2.1 The Austrian Hotel and Tourism Bank
All firms in our analysis are clients of the Austrian Hotel and Tourism Bank
(AHTB). The AHTB was initially founded in 1947 as part of the Marshall Plan
to reconstruct post World War 2 Europe, and its focus is on stimulating the
tourism industry by provision of traditional banking services, which includes
subsidized loans. Typically, the Austrian Tourism Bank’s targets pivotal hotels
in the local economy; therefore, the firms in our sample are larger than the
average Austrian hotel.10 We focus on hotels in the 10 kilometer radius around
ski resorts, this represents about 17.5% of firms on the bank’s client list.
2.2 The Austrian hotel industry
The hotels in our sample are likely to be family-owned firms, as family-owned
firms make up for 93% of all firms in the industry.Doerflinger et al. (2013) While
there are some hotel chains in urban areas, these firms are not contained in
10 Data about the size of hotels is contained in Statistik Austria (2018). At the end of
our sample period in 2006, the average Austrian hotel business had an accommodation
capacity of 17.9 beds. The firms in our sample had an average accommodation capacity
of 94.5 (median 80) beds.
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our sample because we focus on hotel firms in ski resorts and exclude firms in
towns with a population larger than 20,000.11
Given the size of our hotels, it is highly unlikely that they place a bond or
issue public equity. As relatively small and family-owned firms, the firms in
our sample depend mostly on bank debt as source of outside financing. If the
firms receive outside equity, it is typically from relatives.12 Hotels can use their
buildings and land as collateral when borrowing from banks.
According to a report of the Austrian Ministry of Economy, the median lever-
age of Austrian three-star hotels was 119 % in the year 2003, while higher-
quality hotels featured a leverage of 102 %.13 These numbers are based on
book values which allow for negative equity.
As firms in ski resorts, the firms in our sample cater to tourists whose demand
depends on the snow conditions in the resorts. During our sample period,
the hotels had limited ability to financially or operationally hedge the risk of
a shortage in snow. To the best of our knowledge, there were no insurance
products available, with which hotels could have insured the risk of a bad
winter.14 The most popular way how ski resorts manage their exposure to
weather risk is by creating artificial snow. However, the prevalence of snow
cannons during our sample period was very low. In fact, according to an
Austrian newspaper report (see Salzburger Nachrichten (2015)), in 2007, one
year after the end of our sample period, there existed less snow cannons in
entire Europe than there did in three Austrian ski resorts alone in 201515. In
11 The alpine regions in Austria are only sparsely populated: e.g. the size of 20,000 will in
Tyrol only exclude the capital city Innsbruck.
12 Loans from relatives are also treated as equity investments under Austrian bankruptcy
law.
13 We report numbers for the year 2003 since this year is contained in our sample period
(ending in 2006).
14 Likewise, according to survey data from 2006 weather derivatives were primarily used by
energy companies.Barrieu and Scaillet (2010)
15 About 3,100 in 2007 versus 3,146 in 2015. The ski resorts are Ischgl (1,100), Wilder Kaiser
(1,359), and Planai (690)
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total there existed about 19,000 snow cannons in Austria in 2015. Töglhofer,
Eigner, and Prettenthaler (2011) analyze panel data about 185 Austrian ski
resorts and find that an unexpected change in snow conditions by one standard
deviation changes the number of tourists’ overnight stays in nearby hotels by
0.6-1.9%. In subsection 5.2.1, we find even stronger results for the firms in
our sample. The cancellation policies for bookings at Austrian hotels are fixed
in nationwide, industry-standard booking contracts. As a consequence, data
about natural snow levels can be used as a measure for touristic demand.
Ski hotels employ a large fraction of seasonal employees throughout the winter
season. Baumgartner et al. (2020) show that the average firm in the Austrian
tourism industry, the share of seasonal employees is about 50% during the
main part of the winter season. The employees often come from far away and
are not customers of the firm. Most hotels in Austria use industry standard
labor contracts. In these contracts, the notice period for layoffs is 2 weeks. The
wage schemes in these contracts do not contain bonus pay or stock options.
3 Research strategy
We analyze to what extent firms share sales risk with their stakeholders by ad-
justing the contemporaneous payment to their stakeholders. The stakeholders
we analyze are their banks, workers, suppliers, and landlords. For example,
if firms are hit by an adverse sales shock, they might react by (i) laying off
workers, or (ii) renegotiating terms of the loans with their banks. In both
examples, we would observe a positive correlation between realized sales and
the payments from the firms to their stakeholders, in the example their work-
ers and the house-banks. Technically, we measure the sensitivity of firm i’s
payments to its stakeholders with respect to changes in sales. Consider the
following regression equation:
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psi,t = β Salesit + γ Xt + αi + αt + ϵi,t (1)
where psi,t denotes the payment from firm i to stakeholder s in period t. Xt
denotes a vector of firm level control variables and αi (αt) denotes firm (year)
fixed effects. β is defined as the change (in Euros) in the payment directed
to stakeholder s given a 1 Euro increase in firm level sales. A β equal to
zero would indicate that stakeholders are isolated from variation in sales and
therefore do not bear firm level sales risk. In contrast, a positive estimate
for β would be consistent with risk-sharing, i.e. firm i adjusting its payments
to stakeholder s conditional on its sales. However, β in 1 only measures the
correlation between the two variables and does not allow us to make a causal
statement about the causal effect of sales on the payments to the stakeholders.
Consider the following example for loan related payments to banks. If firm i
enlarged the capacity of its hotel from one year to another and financed this
expansion via a bank loan, we would expect to see (i) increased repayments and
interests because of the loan, and (ii) higher sales as a result of the increased
capacity. Therefore, our OLS analysis is subject to the concern of reverse
causality.16
We make use of the fact, that the firms in our sample are subject to an ex-
ogenous source of variation in sales: Snow. As explained more in more detail
in subsection 2.2, snow shifts tourists’ demand for ski hotels’ services. At
the same time, snowfall is a natural event, which is plausibly not influenced
by any firm level policy.17 It is also plausible that snow has no direct effect
on firms’ payments to the stakeholders other than through firms’ sales. For
example, industry standard labor contracts do not include wage payments to
16 Similar arguments can be made with the firm’s wage bill, its trade credits, and its rent.
17 Note that, as explained in 2, at the time of our analysis the creation of artificial snow was
not as widely spread as it is today.
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be contingent to the annual snow realization. Likewise, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the predetermined payments related to loan contracts are not
conditional on snow. We use snow18 as an instrumental variable for sales in
our regressions. In a standard two stage least squares specification, we first
regress sales on snow:
Salesi,t = b Snowj(m),t + g Xt + ai + ei,t (2)
and use the prediction of sales, Ŝalesi,t as regressor in the second stage regres-
sion:
psi,t = β′ Ŝalesi,t + γ′ Xt + α′i + ϵi,t. (3)
The β′ coefficient estimated from equation 3 is the counterpart of β estimated
from 1. However, it is not a pure correlation but it allows for causal interpreta-
tion of the sensitivity of stakeholders’ cash flows to changes in firm level sales.
The coefficient b in the first stage measures the average exposure of sales to
snow risk. If hotels were able to operationally hedge snow risk perfectly by the
use of artificial snow, b would be indistinguishable from zero, and we would
have the problem of a weak instrument. If, however, hotels are exposed to
snow risk, b is larger than zero.
As Snowj(m),t varies only on the level of the ski resort j which is closest to
the municipality m of hotel i, we allow the residuals in our regressions to be
correlated with each other in the same ski resort, i.e. we cluster the standard
errors on ski resort level.
Focusing on ski hotels and using snow to instrument for sales has an interesting
feature. Instead of being reliant on the popular but rather technical method
18 As defined in equation 10
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suggested by Guiso et al. (2005) to distinguish between temporary and per-
sistent shocks to firm level sales, our research design enables us to use two
empirical counterparts of temporary and persistent shocks to within-season
sales. A lack of snow at the beginning of a winter season can be considered
temporary, as snow is very likely to fall throughout the winter season. In con-
trast, adverse snow shocks at the late part of the winter season have a rather
permanent effect: as spring comes closer, snow fall gets less likely. We use both
snow in the early part and in the late part19 of the winter season as instruments
for sales in separate regressions. Results from the previous literature suggest,
that hotels provide more insurance to their workers against temporary shocks
than against persistent shocks.
We test four main hypotheses. First, we empirically test the statement of
Knight (1921) from the beginning of the paper. If the notion of Knight (1921)
prevails, first, we expect the sensitivity β′e to be positive and significant for
regressions of contemporaneous dividend payouts on sales, and, second, we
expect workers to be isolated from sales shocks, i,e. β′w = 0.
Second, as our hotels are highly dependent on bank debt and are small and
opaque, we expect them to be in a lending relation with their house-bank.
We test the predictions of Boot (2000) and Boot et al. (1993), suggesting that
banks are willing to renegotiate existing loans in lending relationships when the
borrowers are hit by temporary negative sales shocks.20 If this is the case, we
expect the hotel to be able to share the sales risk with their banks. Therefore,
we expect the β′b > 0 for loan related payments.
Third, we test whether hotels share sales risk with their suppliers via the
provision of trade credit. Petersen and Rajan (1997) argue that, similar to re-
19 Defined by equations 11 and 12
20 Note that the duration of snow shocks is limited to one winter season. The permanent
negative shocks in the ending weeks of the winter season are only permanent within the
winter season.
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lationship lenders, suppliers may have an comparative advantage in generating
private information about the quality of their borrowers. At the same time,
their objective is more long-term oriented, because they profit from potential
future sales. If suppliers take on part of the firms’ sales risk, we expect a
β′tc > 0.
Fourth, a similar argument can be made for the suppliers of land, i.e. the
hotels’ landlords. If hotels are able to share sales risk with their landlords by
adjusting their rental payments, we expect to find β′L > 0.
4 Data
4.1 Data sources
Firm level data is retrieved from the Austrian Tourism Bank (AHTB)21. Our
complete data set contains the full set of this bank’s clients between 1999 and
2012.22 In total, we observe hotels’ annual reports, containing the balance
sheets and profit and loss statements, for 4,684 firms in the Austrian tourism
sector. The hotels report book values, market values are not available as the
firms in our sample are all in privately owned.
We use weather data for the years 1973 to 2006. The data come from the
Austrian Meteorological Office (AMO) and cover the entire area of Austria.
The AMO provides 1 × 1 km grid data containing daily information on snow
depth, based on a snow cover model using air temperature and precipitation
data (Beck, Hiebl, Koch, Potzmann, and Schöner (2009)). In order to measure
the snow conditions in ski resorts, we use the coordinates of all ski lifts in
Austria from OpenStreetMap, and calculate the average snow coverage of all
lifts within a radius of 10 kilometers for each ski resort. For our snow data, the
definition of a year deviates from that of a calendar year. To not tear apart a
21 For more information on the Austrian Tourism Bank please see the subsection 2.
22 We drop the year 1999, because the data coverage for this year is very low.
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winter season, we define “season-year” t to start with the first of November of
calendar year t − 1 and end with the 31st of October in calendar year t.
The balance sheet data and snow data are matched using the 5 digit official
municipality key. We match the firm level balance sheets in calendar year t
with snow data of “season-year” t. We have no information on the reporting
date of the hotels in our sample. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the ski
hotels rarely break the winter season into two parts by reporting at the end of
the calendar year. Our results on the effect of snow on firm level sales suggest
the same. The magnitude of the effect of snow in early period of the winter
season, i.e. in months November and December of calendar year t − 1, on
sales is comparable to the effect of snow over the whole winter season t on
sales. Out of 4,684 hotels, we select 818 hotels which are located within a 10
kilometer radius around one of Austria’s 264 ski resorts.23 For these firms,
we construct an (unbalanced) firm-year panel data set containing the balance
sheet information and snow data.
We exclude firm-years which display an unusual pattern in sales growth, i.e.
observations for which the absolute value of the annual growth rate in sales
is higher than 80%. To ensure that the firms in our sample have comparable
production functions, we further exclude firms which have ownership of their
local ski lifts and firms which make the majority of their sales from food &
beverages, i.e. firms which are primarily a restaurant. Furthermore, we exclude
hotels in cities24 because these hotels are more likely to belong to one of the
bigger hotel chains, and demand in cities is likely to be driven by different
factors than for the rest of our sample.
23 As stated in 2, these firms tend to be larger than the average hotel in Austria.
24 We define a town as city if the population exceeds 20,000 inhabitants. This may seem
low, but in the state of Tirol this includes only the capital Innsbruck.
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4.2 Definition of variables
4.2.1 Dependent variables
In order to measure the risk sharing between a hotel and its stakeholders, we
define variables which proxy for the payment from the firm to its stakeholders.25
Since all hotels in our sample are privately held, market values are not available.
To account for outliers, all firm level variables are winsorized at the 1% level
at both tails of the distribution.
Banks. We define the payments made by the hotel to its dominant supplier
of (outside) capital, banks.26. We try to capture the payments associated with
bank loans and define pBi,t as the difference in bank debt outstanding between
the years t − 1 and t, ∆Li,t, and add the hotel’s total interest payments, Ii,t,
as reported by the hotel in year t’s profit and loss statement. That is:
pBi,t = −∆Li,t + Ii,t = −∆Llti,t − ∆Lsti,t + Ii,t (4)
where Lsti,t and Llti,t denote a hotel’s short-term bank debt outstanding and long-
term bank debt outstanding, respectively. The negative value of the annual
change in long (short) term bank debt outstanding is an aggregated measure of
the repayment of long (short) term loans and the provision of new long (short)
term loans. If pB is positive, we interpret it as a net payment from the hotel
to its banks. If the borrower is unable to meet the scheduled repayments of
25 Data from the balance sheet give us annual snapshots from which we can estimate the
flows between the hotels and the shareholders. Data containing more frequent reporting
periods are not available.
26 For a discussion of why hotels in our sample are unlikely to have other sources of outside
finance, see 2.
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the loan, the bank and the borrower typically enter into bilateral negotiation
on the deferral of interests and repayments.27
Workers. Payments from hotels and their workers, pwi,t, are measured by the
total wage bill reported in the hotels’ balance sheets in period t. The variable is
decomposed into its two components representing the intensive and extensive
margin: the average wage and the average number of employees per year.
pwi,t = Wage billi,t = Average wagei,t × # of employeesi,t (5)
Variation in the average wage can be attributed to bonus pay or other perfor-
mance related wage schemes.
Suppliers. Through the provision of trade credit, hotels’ suppliers of mate-
rial inputs and services have the ability to play a similar role to that of a bank.
The trade credit related payments between hotels and them are defined as:
ptci,t = −(Trade Crediti,t − Trade Creditt−1) (6)
Negative values of ptc indicate that the suppliers in sum provided additional
trade credit to the hotel in period t. Positive values of ptc mean that hotels’
repayment of trade credit exceeded the borrowing from suppliers in period t.
Landlords. Although hotels typically own most of their buildings and land,
the vast majority of them engage in some minor renting activity.28 The pay-
ments from hotels to landlords, pL, is the annual rental fee from hotels’ profit
and loss statements.
27 By default, if a borrower cannot pay back her loan, the repayment is deferred for three
months and the loan is prolonged for this period.
28 The median firm has annual rental fees of 11,300 Euros.
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Entrepreneurs. As the firms in our sample are all private, we are not able
to observe payments directed to the firms’ owners directly. Instead, we use
a method standard in accounting (see Stickney, Weil, Schipper, and Francis
(2009)) and calculate the payments from information stated on the banks’ bal-
ance sheets. Dividends to hotels’ owners are defined as the difference between
net profits and the change in retained earnings from period t to t + 1, that is:
pei,t = Net Profiti,t − ∆Retained Earningsi,t+1 (7)
pei,t measures the part of firms’ annual profits which is not kept within the firm
but paid out to the entrepreneurs.29 This measure is limited in that it does
not allow us to measure payouts to the entrepreneurs in the form of wages or
perks.
In additional tests, we use an alternative measure of pe by substituting the
change in retained earnings in 7 with the change in equity, i.e.:
pe,alti,t = Net Profiti,t − ∆Equityi,t+1 (8)
We do this because the standard accounting measure of dividends does not
capture capital flows from the entrepreneurs into the firms. However, it is
interesting to see if the entrepreneurs inject capital into the company as a
result of a sales shock. Our alternative measure would capture this.
29 Note that in our sample, as hotels are privately held, share repurchases are not an option
to transfer funds to the owners.
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4.2.2 Sales & snow
Sales. Annual sales revenue is the main independent variable of interest.
Sales is defined as:
Salesi,t = SalesNi,t + SalesF &Bi,t (9)
where SalesNi,t and SalesF &Bi,t denote sales generated by nights accommodation
and food & beverage, respectively. In robustness checks which are reported
in the Online Appendix, we use the annual quantity of services sold, i.e. the
annual total number of nights accommodation, denoted by Nightsi,t.
Snow. We define a dummy variable which measures whether it was possible
to ski within the specific resort during a given week. This “Snow Day” dummy
equals one if the ski lift’s average snow level exceeded 10 centimeters at the
time of measurement. In our main analysis, we use the sum of this dummy
variable over all days, d, of year t’s winter season, Wi,t. We define the winter






where j(m) denotes ski resort j located the closest to municipality m. The
maximum distance between a hotel and a ski resort is set to 10 kilometers. If
the distance exceeds 10 kilometers the variable is missing and the firm drops
out of the sample. In further analyses, we define two alternative versions of
this variable covering the two off-season periods of the winter season, the early










The early period of the winter season, W earlyt , includes the months November
and December and the late period of the winter season, W latet consists of the
months March and April.
We define dummy variables which indicate whether a winter was particularly
good or bad. Bad (good) winter is defined as a dummy variable equaling one,
if the number of snow days, Snow, is at least 1.2 standard deviations lower
(higher) than the mean of Snow, i.e.: (Snow − ¯Snow)/σsnow < −1.2, and zero
else.
4.2.3 Control variables & variables determining sample splits
We use firm level control variables in some our regressions. Financial lever-
age, Lev, is defined as the ratio between total debt and total assets (Levi,t =
Totaldebti,t/Totalassetsi,t). Capital expenditures, CAPEXi,t, is defined as
the sum of the annual change in PP&E30 and period t’s depreciation of hotels’
assets (CAPEXi,t = ∆PP&Ei,t +Depreciationi,t). To control for hotels’ prof-
itability, we use the return on investment (ROIi,t) as reported by the AHTB.
In section 7, we use dummy variables to split our sample according to hotels’
(i) size, (ii) financial leverage, (iii) labor market tightness in their counties,
and (iv) the competition among banks which surround them.
30 PP&E stands for property, plant, and equipment.
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We define small firms as a dummy variable which equals one if the hotel’s
average amount of total assets over the whole sample period is smaller than
that of the median firm.
Similarly, we define high leverage as a dummy variable equaling one, if the
average leverage ratio of the firm over the sample period lies in the top 25%
of the distribution. This dummy variable should capture firms which are close
to financial distress.
Our measure for bank level competition is the number of distinct banks31
within the 10 kilometer radius around the hotel. We measure labor market
tightness as the inverse of the unemployment rate in county c of hotel i, i.e.
LMTc(i),t = 1−unemployment ratec(i),t. For both variables, number of distinct
banks and labor market tightness, we compute the hotels’ average value over
the years of our sample and define a dummy variable which splits the sample
at the median.
4.3 Summary statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables in our analysis. We split
the overall standard deviation into a between and a within component. The
between component reflects pure cross-sectional variation between the hotels
in our sample. In contrast, the within component measures only the variation
over time.
On average, the firms in our sample received more money from the banks than
they paid to them. The flow related to long term and short term loans exhibit
relatively high within standard deviation, suggesting that the hotels invested
during the sample period and financed the investment via bank loans.32 In-
31 We treat banks which belong to one the same group (for example Sparkassen) as one
bank, as they typically are not allowed to compete with each other.
32 Consistent with this explanation, we find capital expenditures to be positive on average
and displaying high within standard deviation.
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terest payments on average equal about 7,1% of sales revenues.33 The within
variation is relatively low, when compared to the other components of pb.
Mean and standard deviation of trade credit seems comparable to the short
term component of pb. Dividends to owners account for about 55% of the total
wage bill. The within standard deviation is a lot higher for dividends than it
is for the wage bill.
On average, the hotels in our sample experience a little more than 133 snow
days throughout the winter season. The within standard deviation accounts for
about 16% of the average duration of the winter season. An average hotel has
total assets of 3.2 million Euros. The majority of the variation in total assets
is caused by variation between the hotels. Our firms are heavily indebted.
The average firm has a book leverage of 110%. However, this is common for
that industry as explained in section 2.2. The firms’ ROI is about 7.3% on
average and the average hotel is located in the vicinity of 5.6 different banks.
The unemployment rate in the counties is 10.8% on average. To account for
outliers, all firm level variables are winsorized at the 1% level at both tails of
the distribution.
5 Results
We present our results in the following order: First, OLS regressions are pre-
sented in subsection 5.1 and, second, causal evidence from instrumental vari-
ables regressions is presented in subsection 5.2. In all regressions we allow
residuals to be correlated in the same ski resort.
5.1 OLS results
Banks. Table 2 reports estimates of regression equation 1 for loan related
payments to banks. In column 1 to 3, we regress pB as defined in 4 on sales
33 The average interest rate equals about 6% of debt outstanding.
29
and a set of control variables. The sensitivity of pB with respect to within
variation in sales, β, is positive and statistically significant. For every extra
Euro in sales, our hotels pay 65 cents to their banks. The magnitude of β drops
significantly when including firm-level controls. This makes sense as capital
expenditures in the hotel industry can be assumed to be financed via (long
term) loans, which is consistent with the negative estimates for the coefficient
of CAPEX. We disentangle pB in its three components and report the results
from column 4 on. When controlling for firm level control variables, repayment
of long term loans, ∆Llt, is not correlated with sales. In contrast, we find a
positive and significant β for short term loan repayments, ∆Lst, and interest
payments, I. A one dollar decrease in sales is associated with a 15 (6.2) cents
decrease in the repayment of short term loans (interest repayments). The
magnitude of the coefficients is stable when controlling for year fixed effects
and firm level control variables.
Workers. Columns 1 to 3 in table 3 report results indicating a statistically
and economically significant relation between sales and the total wage pay-
ments to workers. As reported in column 1, a one dollar decrease in sales is
associated with an approximate 24 cent drop in wage payments. This mag-
nitude of the effect is relatively stable when controlling for firm level control
variables and year fixed effects. The results in the remaining columns (4-9)
suggest that both the number of workers, as well as, the average wage per
worker correlate positively with sales. These results suggest that firms do not
provide wage insurance (as in Guiso et al. (2005)) or employment insurance
(as in Ellul et al. (2018)) to their employees.
Suppliers. The results in columns 1 to 3 of table 4 document a statistically
and economically significant correlation between sales and the payments re-
lated to trade credit. As reported in column 1, a one dollar decrease in sales
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is associated with a 20 cent increase in trade credit. The magnitude of this
effect is stable when controlling for firm level control variables and year fixed
effects.
Landlords. Columns 4 to 6 of table 4 report results about the relation be-
tween sales and rents payed to landlords. We find a positive and statistically
significant effect. The economic significance is rather low. This is not surpris-
ing, given that the average firm in our sample pays rental fees of about 28,000
Euros per year in total.
Entrepreneurs. In columns 7 to 9 of table 4, we report results regarding
the relation between sales and the payouts to the firm’s owners. As explained
in 2.2, most of our firms are family firms and are owner-managed.34 The
results suggest that in good years dividends to owners are high, whereas in
bad years, owners abstain from paying high dividends. The magnitude of the
coefficient is economically significant, i.e. for every dollar of additional sales
payouts to owners increase by about 25 cents (column 7). The magnitude of
the coefficient is comparable to the sensitive the wage bill payments to sales
(see 3). In the first three columns of table 1 in the Appendix, we run the same
set of regressions for the alternative definition of pe stated in 8 and find similar
results.
5.2 IV estimation
Given the endogeneity of hotels’ sales in the previous regressions, it is ques-
tionable what we can learn from the results reported in 5.1. In this subsection,
we try to establish the causal relationship between changes in firm level sales
the firms’ payments to their stakeholders. First, we present a quasi first stage
34 Note that the firms in our sample are private companies. Therefore, share repurchases
are unlikely to happen at our firms.
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of our in 5.2.1. Second, we show estimates of the second stage IV regressions in
5.2. Third, in 6 we report IV estimates for temporary and permanent shocks to
sales. Fourth, we analyze if the payment sensitivity is stable among different
sub-groups of our sample in 7.
5.2.1 Exposure to snow risk
In principle, hotels could hedge against snow risk. In section 2.2, we explain
why we think that they were not able to perfectly do so during the time of
our sample. In table 5, we test if hotels were exposed to snow risk empirically.
Columns 1 and 2 of table 5 display the strong positive relationship between
snow and sales in our sample. An additional day of snow increases the sales of
our hotels by about 1,700 Euros. The results in column 3 show that the effect
is primarily driven by decreases in sales during particularly bad winters35.
This is plausible, since ski hotels have a maximum level of capacity which
sets an upper bound to sales. Column 5 breaks down snow into its off-season
components: early season and late season snow. The results suggest that the
snow shocks exhibit a particularly strong effect on sales in the late season. A
10 day increase in snow days at the end of the season explains 18% of the
within firm standard deviation of sales.
The results are essentially the same if we run the analyses for nights accommo-
dation instead of sales.36 All in all, the results in table 5 suggest, that hotels
in our sample are exposed to weather risk, and that snow as an instrumen-
tal variable is relevant. Given that the firms in our sample are larger than
the average firm in the industry and that larger firms are better able to op-
erationally hedge weather risk37, we expect the average relationship between
snow and sales in the industry to be even larger.
35 For the exact definition of good (bad) winter see section 4.
36 An additional day of snow translates into an increase of nights accommodation by 17
nights.
37 By offering alternatives to skiing. For example, a hotel could install a spa area.
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5.2.2 Stakeholders’ payments and sales
Banks. Table 6 reports estimates for the second stage regression as defined
in 3 in which ps equals payments to banks. Regarding the total payments to
banks pB, the estimate of the sensitivity payments to banks with respect to
sales shrinks from 0.85 (OLS) to 0.26 in column 1. In column 2, we find similar
β estimates for the instrumental variables regression and the OLS regression,
when controlling for firm level control variables. For every additional Euro of
weather induced sales, roughly 39 cents flow from the hotels to their banks.
This effect is significant at the 10% confidence level. The sizable and nega-
tive estimate for CAPEX suggests that hotels finance the majority of their
investments via bank credit.
In columns 3 to 8, we report the results for separate regressions for the com-
ponents of pB. In columns 4, there is weak evidence that hotels use weather
induced sales revenues to repay their long-term loans. The coefficient for β′
is larger than its OLS counterpart, but it is measured imprecisely, and there-
fore insignificant. In contrast, payments related to short term bank debt are
not exposed to weather induced shocks to hotels’ sales. The estimate of β in
columns 5 and 6 are significantly smaller than the estimates from OLS regres-
sions. We can reject the exogeneity of sales38 in the IV regression of −∆Lst
on sales in column 5. This allows to cautiously conclude that hotels do not
finance liquidity shortages after bad winters by the use of short term bank
debt.
In columns 7 and 8, we report results of the sensitivity of hotels’ interest pay-
ments to their snow induced sales. The magnitude of the sensitivity increases
by more than 40% when changing from OLS to instrumental variables estima-
tion. A one Euro decrease in sales leads to a reduction of interest payments by
about 8.5 cents in column 8. This suggests that to some extent, banks allow
38 We use the standard “difference-in-Sargan” test provided by STATA’s ivreg2 command.
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their customers to adjust the interest payments dependent on the realization
of snow during the winter season.
We find evidence that hotels share sales risk with their house banks especially
by adjusting their interest payments after exogenous sales shocks. One channel
of liquidity provision by house-banks, is the use of credit lines. Using aggre-
gated data, we cannot directly observe credit lines, but the pattern of our
results regarding −∆Lst and interest payments does not point to the use of
credit lines to manage liquidity shortages after bad winters.39 Extreme snow
realizations could foster people’s beliefs that the parameters of the distribution
of snow are changing. This could affect hotels’ investment behavior. For ex-
ample, after good winters, hotels might be tempted to expand their capacity.
Typically, an expansion like this would be financed via long term bank debt.
If this channel dominates, we would expect to see a negative relation between
weather induced sales and pB but we find the opposite result.
Workers. In table 7, we report results regarding the causal effect of sales on
hotels’ payments to their employees. Reported in columns 1 and 2, a one Euro
decrease in sales causes the wage bill to fall by about 21 cents. The estimates of
β in the IV regressions are roughly 10 percent smaller when compared to OLS
estimates. The results in columns 3 and 4 suggest, that firms share exogeneous
sales risk with their workers by not hiring or firing them. A 100,000 decrease in
sales revenues leads to the firing of one employee. In contrast, workers’ annual
wages are not sensitive to shocks in hotels’ sales.40 These results suggest that
firms share weather induced sales risk with their workers via the extensive
margin.
39 We would expect interest payments and −∆Lst to be negatively related to snow induced
shocks.
40 This is consistent with the previous results in the literature (see for example Guiso et al.
(2005)).
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Suppliers & landlords. The results in columns 1 and 2 of table 8 indicating
no risk sharing of sales risk between hotels and their suppliers in the form of
trade credit. The sensitivity is not statistically significantly different from zero
and the magnitude of the sensitivity is reduces by half compared to the OLS
results. Similar results are found for suppliers: Rental fees are not sensitive to
weather induced sales shocks (see columns 3 and 4 of table of table 8).
Entrepreneurs. Surprisingly, in columns 5 and 6 of table 8, we do not find
the sensitivity of pe to sales to be statistically significantly different from zero.
That means, the payments to the hotels’ owners are not systematically exposed
to exogenous changes in hotels’ sales caused by snow. Note that the size of
the coefficient does not shrink significantly41 but the standard errors increase.
This is unlikely to be caused by weak identification, as the F-statistic in the
first stage regression is high. Also, inflating standard errors in the IV analysis
is not a problem when regressing payments to workers, pw, on sales in table 7.
This suggests that if the firms’ entrepreneurs bear sales risk, they do so in other
ways than by adjusting their contemporaneous payouts to them.42 This result
is limited because we cannot observe directly wages and perks directed to the
owner-managers of our firms. An alternative explanation for our findings could
be that hotels’ owner-managers chose to pay themselves higher wages instead
of paying out profits in the form of dividends. However, in table 7 we do not
find the average wage in hotels to be sensitive to weather induced sales. Perks
are not observable given our data.
In the last two columns of table 1 in the Appendix, we run the same set of
regressions for the alternative definition of pe stated in 8 and find comparable
results. With this alternative definition, we are able to identify whether owners
41 A test for the endogeneity of Sales cannot be rejected.
42 Note that the firms in our sample are typically non-listed family firms and do not payout
cash to their owners in the form of share repurchases.
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inject capital as a response to a bad winter. However, we do not find evidence
that this is the case, instead the results are relatively close to the results stated
in table 8.
Results. To sum up the IV results - we find quite the opposite of the hy-
pothesis of Knight (1921). Entrepreneurs seem not to bear sales risk but there
is evidence suggesting that workers do. In addition, our results suggest that
entrepreneurs seem to able to share the sales risk with their house-banks by
adjusting the interest payments. We do not find evidence for the sharing of
sales risk between the hotels their suppliers and landlords.
Concerning the problem of weak instrumentation in out IV regressions, the
F-Test statistics43 of the significance of the excluded instruments in the first
stage regressions ranges from 26.2 to 38.2 and, hence, lie above the classical
“rule of thumb” threshold of 10 as suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) or the
criteria suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005). Therefore, as suggested by the
results in subsection 5.2.1, snow is not a weak instrument in our IV regressions.
6 Temporary versus persistent sales shocks
We analyze whether hotels’ risk sharing with their workers and their house
banks depends on the persistence of the sales shock. By nature, snow induced
sales shocks are not persistent from one winter season to another. However,
we can distinguish between persistent and temporary sales shocks within the
winter season. During the starting weeks of the winter season, negative snow
shocks are temporary because additional snow is likely to fall in the following
weeks. In contrast, negative snow shocks that happen at the end of the winter
season are rather persistent. Once snow has melted at the end of the season,
43 We report the Cragg-Donald F-statistic.
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new snow fall becomes less likely as spring gets closer. Instead of using the
total number of snow days in as an instrumental variable, we separately use
the number of snow days in the early season and the late season (as defined in
equations 11 and 12) to estimate equation 2.
Workers. Given that ski hotels employ a high fraction of seasonal workers
and given the findings of Guiso et al. (2005), we expect hotels to provide more
insurance to workers against temporary than against persistent within-season
sales shocks. In table 10 we present the results for regressions of the total wage
bill on firm level sales. In columns 1, 3, and 5, we report the results of the
first stage regressions (see equation 2). As in our previous analysis, we use the
total number of snow days in column 1. In column 3 (5), we instrument sales
by snow days in the early (late) period of the winter season, i.e. sales shocks
which are temporary (permanent). We present the results of the second stage
regressions of our different instrumentation strategies in columns 2, 4, and 6.
As previously shown in 7, we find workers not to be sheltered from weather
induced sales shocks in column 2. However, our result in column 4 suggests
that firms are insuring their workers against sales risk caused by snow shocks
in the early season, i.e. against temporary shocks. As reported in column 6,
the risk sharing between hotels and their workers happens at the end of the
winter season when weather induced sales shocks are persistent. This result
is not driven by imprecise measurement of the effect during the early part of
the season. The magnitude of the coefficient of early snow in the first stage
is comparable with that of total snow. The F-Test statistic suggest that early
snow does not seem to be a weak instrument. However, the magnitude of β in
the second stage shrinks by half when instrumenting by early snow, instead of
total snow. The findings are consistent with the previous literature (see Guiso
et al. (2005), Ellul et al. (2018)).
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Banks. After analyzing the wage bill to workers, we turn to the risk sharing
between firms and banks via the adjustment of interest payments. Baumgart-
ner et al. (2020) find that banks’ capitalization has an effect on entrepreneurs’
risk taking behavior in the early period of the winter season. Using the same
framework as in the previous paragraph, we analyze the relationship between
hotels’ annual interest payments and weather induced sales shocks. The es-
timates in table 9 suggest that hotels do indeed share sales risk with their
house-banks during the late period of the winter season (as well as during
the early period); a result consistent with the findings in Baumgartner et al.
(2020). We do not find a difference in risk sharing between hotels and their
house banks for temporary and persistent within-season sales shocks. Hotels
are able to share both kinds of shocks with their house-banks. This is not
surprising, as the duration of the lending relationship is very likely to exceed
one winter season and, therefore, persistent within-season sales shocks are still
considered temporary by the hotels’ house-banks.
7 Cross-sectional variation in β
In this subsection, we analyze how the effect measured in subsection 5.2 varies
within different subgroups of our sample. We focus on those stakeholders, for
which we found a positive and significant sensitivity of payment to sales in
subsection 5.2.2: banks and workers. We perform the sample split on size
because there can be differences in the bargaining power to renegotiate wages
or defer interest payments between smaller and larger firms. Similar to the
family firm argument in Ellul et al. (2018), smaller firms might be better able
to credibly commit to provide their employees with employment insurance.
Workers. We split the sample according to the hotels’ size, financial lever-
age, and the labor market tightness of the surrounding county. Given the short
time horizon of our sample, all variables which determine the sample splits are
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time-invariant, i.e. firms do not switch between the sub samples over time.44
Table 11 reports results of separate IV second stage regression performed on
each sub-sample. The results in column 1 and 2 show that the sensitivity of
hotels’ wage bill to changes in sales is both positive and significant for small
and large firms. The magnitude of the coefficient is lower for small firms. In
table 2 in the Appendix we show that the difference between the coefficients for
small and large hotels in a reduced form regression is statistically significant.
This finding is consistent with the notion of small, family owned businesses
being better able to credibly grant employment insurance to their workers (see
Ellul et al. (2018)).
Columns 3 and 4 of table 11 show that firms in financial trouble are not able to
share weather induced sales risk with their workers.45 Reduced form estimates
reported in table 2 in the Appendix support this result. Given that we do
not find wage insurance, one explanation for this finding is that high leverage
firms are not able to adjust their employment as other firms because they are
left with only the key employees, probably mostly family members.46 The
remaining workforce is not taking snow induced sales out of the firms in the
form of wages, a result consistent with the interpretation of the wage result in
Giroud et al. (2011).47
Columns 5 and 6 of table 11 report results of a sample split according to
the labor market tightness48 of the hotel’s county. We find that hotels share
sales risk in counties that display high labor market tightness. The difference
between the coefficients for high and low labor market tightness is significant in
the reduced form regression reported in table 2 in the Appendix. In counties
44 For an exact definition of the variables, see 4.
45 Note that we have a week identification problem in the regression producing the results
of column 4.
46 In unreported tests, we find that high leverage firms are in fact more than 30% smaller
and pay significantly lower wages than other firms.
47 The authors interpret low wages as owners’ willingness to keep cash in the firm.
48 Labor market tightness is defined as the inverse of the unemployment rate in the hotel’s
county. For an exact definition, see 4
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with high labor market tightness it should be easy for workers to find new
employment. Thus, employment insurance might not be important for workers
in these counties.49
Banks. Table 12 report similar tests for hotels’ interest payments. The coef-
ficients do not vary when splitting the sample according to firm size in column
1 and 2. We find a difference when splitting according to financial leverage:
Firms with high levels of leverage seem not to be able to adjust their interest
payments as a reaction to weather induced sales.50 This result is consistent
with the result of Giroud et al. (2011) who analyze firms that undergo debt
restructuring with the AHTB. They find that banks are willing to renegoti-
ate terms only to restore managers’ incentives, but not after the hotel has
experienced adverse snow shocks.
In column 5 and 6 of table 12 we study how the risk sharing between firms
and their house-banks is influenced by competition on the bank level. There
exist two opposing theories: Petersen and Rajan (1995) predict that relation-
ship lending is less prevalent in markets with high levels of bank competition,
whereas the model of Boot and Thakor (2000) predicts the opposite. We split
our sample based on the number of competing banks in the vicinity of the
hotels and test the loan related payments in the subgroups are affected by
sales. If the theory of Petersen and Rajan (1995) prevails, we expect β′b > 0
for the sub sample of hotels in low competition banking markets, and β′b indis-
tinguishable from zero in the sub sample of hotels in high competition banking
markets. The opposite pattern in results would lend support to the theory of
Boot and Thakor (2000).
49 We find wages in these counties to be 3.8% higher than in other counties. The evidence
is weak as the difference is not statistically significant.
50 We find the parameters to be significantly different in the reduced form specification
reported in table 2 in the Appendix.
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Hotels are better able to share sales risk with their banks in areas that exhibit
high competition among banks.51 The difference between the parameters is
found to be significant in the reduced form specification reported in table 2
in the Appendix. This finding empirically supports the theory of Boot and
Thakor (2000), which predicts that banks engage more in relationship lending
activity when the level of bank competition is high.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically derive that firms do not insure their workers
against sales risk. This finding contradicts the view of Knight (1921). Our re-
sults indicate that entrepreneurs are able to share sales risk with their workers
using the extensive margin, i.e. adjusting their workforce. In addition, our re-
sults suggest that entrepreneurs share sales risk with their banks by adjusting
their interest payments after exogenous sales shocks. One very interesting re-
sult is that bank level competition seems to increase the degree of risk sharing
the bank is willing to accept. This finding is an empirical counterpart of the
theory of Boot and Thakor (2000). Entrepreneurs seem to demonstrate their
advanced ability in managing risk. In particular, by sharing sales risk with
their stakeholders, their contemporaneous dividend payouts are isolated from
exogenous sales shocks.
Our choice of sample allows us to use snow risk as an exogenous source of
sales risk. We propose a new method for distinguishing between temporary
and persistent shocks, which depends on the timing of the sales shock within
the winter season. Our results on the provision of employment insurance is
consistent with the existing literature. The ski hotel industry is small and
exceptional but it shares many properties with other, more larger and more
important industries like construction or agriculture. The firms are small, bank
51 Bank competition is defined as the number of banks within the 10 kilometers radius around
the hotel. For an exact definition, see 4
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dependent, demand for their products or services exhibits high cyclicality, and
they are exposed to weather risk. Due to climate change, weather risk is
expected to increase in the future and therefore represents a globally severe
challenge for firms in exposed industries. Our findings are therefore relevant to
understand and predict the consequences of climate change on unemployment
and the health of local banking markets. Weather risk is a systematic risk in
local banking markets and therefore constitutes a cluster risk for local banks.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
This table reports the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum, the maximum and the
number of observations for the variables of interest. The data set has a hotel-year panel
structure. We split the overall standard deviation into a between and a within component.
The between component reflects pure cross-sectional variation between the hotels in our
sample. We winsorize 1% on both ends of the distribution for all continuous variables.
Variable Category Mean SD Min Max Obs










-∆LST (in TEUR) overall -25.3 510.3 -5139.2 4908.7 2565
between 150.9 593
within 488.9 4.3
I (in TEUR) overall 100 110 .9 1132.7 2565
between 102.1 593
within 41.4 4.3
pw (in TEUR) overall 321.6 424.7 6.5 4487 2516
between 417.3 534
within 92.9 4.7
# of workers overall 23.8 24.3 2 198 2477
between 24.4 533
within 4.2 4.6
Average wage (in TEUR) overall 13.5 9.8 0.4 209.1 2477
between 8.5 533
within 3.7 4.6
pL (in TEUR) overall 27.9 64.1 0 1158.9 3184
between 55.1 593
within 32.3 5.4
ptc (in TEUR) overall -2.9 251.8 -2472.3 2430.6 2565
between 65.3 593
within 243.9 4.3
pe (in TEUR) overall 178.2 622.8 -4289.1 5888.6 3083
between 565.6 593
within 324.1 5.2
Sales (in TEUR) overall 1409.3 1421.5 72.6 9799.7 3184
between 1433.3 593
within 255.4 5.4
Snow overall 133.5 33.8 0 182 3184
between 26.6 593
within 21.2 5.4
Total Assets (in TEUR) overall 3171.2 4081.3 57.4 46097.8 3181
between 4096.6 593
within 1060.3 5.4
CAPEX (in TEUR) overall 399.5 929 -385.8 8985.9 3184
between 525.5 593
within 770.7 5.4
Leverage overall 110 57.7 5.8 431.8 3181
between 54.1 593
within 21.8 5.4
ROI overall 7.3 8 -30.5 51.2 3184
between 5.9 593
within 5.5 5.4
# of Banks overall 5.6 1.7 2 10 3184
between 1.7 593
within .4 5.4

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1: OLS & IV: Alternative definition of payouts to owners
This table reports estimates of OLS regressions (column 1 to 3) and instrumental variables
regressions (column 4 and 5) for the alternative definition of the payouts to hotels’ owners,
pealt, as defined in equation 8. We regress these payouts on firm level sales and a set of firm
level control variables. For a definition of the firm level variables, see 4. For a discussion of
the table see 5.2.2. At the bottom of the table, we report the F-Test statistic of the excluded
instruments in the first stage regression, and we report the p-value of a Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test for endogeneity of Sales. All regressions include hotel fixed effects. We winsorize 1% on
both ends of the distribution for all continuous variables. Standard errors are clustered at
the ski resort level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
pe,alt
OLS IV
Sales 0.277∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.239 0.262
(0.0659) (0.0644) (0.0680) (0.223) (0.213)
Leverage -1010.2∗∗ -881.4∗∗ -1005.5∗∗
(441.4) (425.5) (495.7)
ROI 9431.7∗∗∗ 10170.2∗∗∗ 9420.4∗∗∗
(1340.6) (1524.3) (1431.0)
CAPEX -0.0129 -0.0149 -0.0127
(0.0160) (0.0157) (0.0179)
N 3083 3080 3080 3083 3080
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO YES NO NO
1st stage F-Test 26.16 27.93
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.86 0.98
60
Table 2: Reduced form: Testing for differences in coefficients.
This table reports estimates of reduced form regressions of hotels’ wage bills, pw, and their
interest payments to their house-banks, I, on Snow. In columns 1 and 4, we interact
Snow with the dummy variable Large, which equals one if the firm is larger than the
median firm, and zero else. In columns 2 and 5, we interact Snow with a dummy variable
indicating if the hotel has a high financial leverage. Firms in the top 25% bracket of the
distribution of leverage are classified as High Leverage. In column 3, we interact Snow
with a dummy variable for the local labor market tightness, LMT. In column 6, we interact
Snow with a dummy indicating a high level of competition in the local banking market.
All regressions include hotel fixed effects. We winsorize 1% on both ends of the distribution
for all continuous variables. Standard errors are clustered at the ski resort level. *,**,***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
pw I
Snow 125.9∗∗∗ 625.5∗∗∗ 145.8 69.85∗∗∗ 258.8∗∗∗ 82.41
(45.66) (146.0) (184.1) (20.20) (52.64) (69.28)
Snow × Large 617.1∗∗∗ 199.3∗∗
(205.4) (76.87)
Snow × High Leverage -637.3∗∗∗ -312.2∗∗∗
(172.2) (67.75)
Snow × High LMT 522.3∗∗
(235.6)
Snow × High # of Banks 195.6∗∗
(88.82)
N 2516 2516 2516 2565 2565 2565
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO
61
Interbank Lending and Banks’ Supply








We analyze interbank lending using a sample of banks in Austrian
ski resorts. The banks are subject to liquidity shocks due to weather-
induced demand shocks in ski tourism. We analyze the effect of these
shocks on interbank lending and borrowing. The analysis reveals that
banks reduce their net lending to other banks at times when they need
to provide liquidity to their customers. Our evidence adds to the lit-
erature regarding the role of the interbank market in banks’ liquidity
creation. It highlights effects of a specific type of liquidity creation,
i.e., the liquidity insurance banks provide to the real sector. We find
that shocks triggering this insurance reduce banks’ longer-term lend-
ing to other banks, but we find no effects on short-term net lending.
Moreover, we observe particularly strong effects on banks with region-
ally focused operations, banks with higher equity ratios, banks that




The market for interbank lending is key to ensuring the liquidity of banks
when they need to respond to shocks affecting their non-bank counterparties.
Paravasini (2008), Khwaja and Mian (2008), Schnabl (2012) and follow-up
papers document the real effects of disruptions to interbank liquidity provision.
Iyer, Lopes, Peydro, and Schoar (2014) show that the unexpected freeze of
the European interbank market in August 2007 caused a credit supply shock
affecting small, entrepreneurial firms.
This paper analyses interbank lending based on a view of banks as suppliers of
liquidity insurance to firms outside the financial sector (Holmstrom and Tirole
(1998), Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002)). Is the provision of this liquidity
insurance associated with interbank liquidity provision? If individual banks
represent “local pools of liquidity” (Holmstrom and Tirole (1998)), are these
pools linked to each other through the market for interbank lending?
To answer these questions, we use a two-step research strategy based on liq-
uidity shocks caused by weather risk, i.e., shocks that occur for exogenous
reasons. We first test whether this risk affects banks as a cause of liquidity
shocks associated with the liquidity insurance they provide to households and
firms in the real economy. This sets the stage for the next step of the analy-
sis in which we test whether interbank lending also responds to the liquidity
shocks. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first evidence regarding
the role of the interbank market in facilitating liquidity insurance that banks
offer to customers outside the financial sector.
Our analysis is based on a sample of Austrian banks with a readily identifiable
exposure to weather risk since they are located close to ski resorts. The banks
operate in regional economies dominated by tourism businesses which are ex-
posed to frequent demand shocks resulting from changes in the ski resorts’
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snow conditions. These demand shocks are clearly unrelated to the banks’
ability to inject liquidity into the surrounding economy because most tourists
come to the ski resorts from other countries or, at least, other parts of Austria.
Instead, the demand shocks cause liquidity shocks in tourism businesses. Our
analysis traces how these liquidity shocks affect the banks and the interbank
market.
In the first part of our analysis, we simply document the liquidity shocks. We
test whether the banks’ deposits fluctuate with the number of tourists visiting
the ski resorts. This test is based on annual data and instrumental vari-
ables regressions in which we use variation in snow conditions to instrument
tourists’ overnight stays in the resorts. Bank deposits could be correlated with
the tourists’ overnight stays for reasons other than weather-induced demand
shocks.1 We want to focus on these shocks because they are clearly unpre-
dictable conditional on regional fixed effects.2 While the weather conditions
can be predicted a fews days ahead, this is often insufficient for tourism firms
because their planning horizons are typically much longer. As a consequence,
the firms are subject to liquidity shocks induced by weather risk, and these
shocks may also affect the firms’ deposits with local banks.3
We find that weather-induced variation in tourists’ overnight stays causes sig-
nificant variation in bank deposits. A one percentage point increase in tourists’
overnight stays creates a 2.5 percentage points increase in deposits. In unre-
1 In fact, there may also be some reverse causality. For example, tourists overnight stays
may increase due to changes in hotels’ prices, and hotels’ pricing policies may depend on
their capital structures and liquidity, including their cash held as bank deposits. For an
analysis, see Pichler, Stomper, and Zulehner (2008) (who also use data about hotels in
Austrian ski resorts).
2 Given that we only have annual data about bank deposits, our estimates come from
variation in snow conditions aggregated to the annual level. Snow conditions are clearly
unpredictable a year ahead.
3 For example, the firms must hire seasonal workers many weeks before the start of the
skiing season because the workers must typically move to the ski resorts before they can
start working. When the firms commit to employing these workers, they take the risk of
liquidity shocks induced by weather risk as a risk of demand shocks. See Baumgartner,
Schober, Stomper, and Winter-Ebmer (2020).
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ported results, we also find similar variation in banks’ loans to non-banks.
This is not surprising because banks aim at adjusting their assets (loans) and
liabilities (deposits). More interesting results come from regressions explaining
the difference between loan and deposit growth. We refer to this difference as
banks’ liquidity provision to the real economy because it measures the extent of
bank lending (positive growth of loans to non-banks) and paying out deposits
(negative deposit growth). If the banks provide liquidity insurance to their
customers, we should see that their liquidity provision responds to liquidity
shocks hitting these customers. This is indeed what we find using liquidity
shocks due to weather-induced variation in tourists’ overnight stays. A one
standard deviation decrease in tourists leads to an increase in net lending to
non-bank customers by half a standard deviation.
Our first set of results sets the stage for the next part of our analysis in
which we test whether the weather-induced variation in tourists’ overnight
stays also affects interbank lending. These tests have the same structure as
those regarding banks’ liquidity provision to non-bank customers, but we focus
on interbank borrowing and lending. The main dependent variable is the
difference between the growth rate of a bank’s loans to other banks and that of
the bank’s loans from other banks. We refer to this difference as net interbank
lending. If this interbank lending facilitates the liquidity insurance that banks
provide to the real sector, we should observe that banks receive higher (net)
loans from other banks at times when the banks’ non-bank customers need
liquidity injections. Put differently, interbank lending should be “crowded
out” by banks’ lending to (non-bank) customers. This is our main hypothesis.
We test the hypothesis by focusing on the weather-induced liquidity shocks to
tourism business in Austrian ski resorts. We find that these shocks cause the
local banks to borrow more from/lend less to other banks. This is consistent
with our hypothesis. A further result comes from distinguishing between short-
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term and long-term loans that banks make to other banks.4 We use our data
about these loans in order to construct two versions of our dependent variable
measuring net interbank lending, i.e., short-term and long-term net lending.
The first variation is the difference between the growth rate of a bank’s short-
term loans to other banks and that of the bank’s loans from other banks. The
second variable is defined in a similar way, but for long-term loans.
We find that it is banks’ long-term net lending to other banks that gets
“crowded out” by their lending to non-bank customers, but short-term in-
terbank lending is not significantly affected. This is consistent with the idea
that the interbank market facilitates the liquidity insurance banks provide to
(non-bank) customers.
While our estimates are about effects of tourism demand shocks, we can use
them to compute a multiplier connecting the observed elasticities of banks’ net
lending to (non-bank) customers and net interbank lending. Given our point
estimates for these elasticities, their ratio equals approximately 12, i.e. a one
percentage point increase in net lending to non-bank customers is associated
with a 12 percentage point decrease in net interbank lending. This is a take-
away from our analysis that may generalize to other settings. We expect that
interbank lending will respond in a similar way to liquidity shocks in other
industries. Our evidence comes from an industry in which it is particularly
easy to identify the liquidity shocks because firms in this industry have few
alternatives to liquidity insurance provided by their banks.
The following section describes our research strategy. Section 3 describes the
institutional background. Section 4 provides a description of the data. The
baseline results are presented in section 5. In section 6, we test for cross-
sectional differences in our baseline results. Section 7 concludes.
4 Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between short-term and long-term loans banks re-
ceive from other banks.
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2 Research strategy
We use data about a sample of banks in Austrian municipalities close to ski
resorts. We choose this sample because the banks operate in regional economies
dominated by ski tourism as an industry whose assets have a readily identifiable
physical location linked to specific weather risks. During our sample period,
the industry faced repeated demand shocks associated with changing snow
conditions in the ski resorts. Our research strategy is based on these demand
shocks as a cause of liquidity shocks.
The inspiration for our analysis comes from Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) view
of the financial system as a liquidity pool which redistributes liquidity between
different parts of an economy. If this view is correct, we should see that the
banks in ski resorts respond to liquidity shocks triggered by demand shocks
due to unfavorable weather. In particular, we should see a decrease in bank
deposits and/or an increase in loans as the banks’ customers demand liquid-
ity by either withdrawing deposits or applying for loans. The first alternative
is actually more straightforward than the second because changes in deposits
are mostly driven by depositors’ decisions. In fact, it is possible that deposit
outflows cause a reduction in credit supply at times when the demand for
bank loans increases as firms seek to cope with liquidity shocks.5 As a con-
sequence, our main dependent variable will measure banks’ overall liquidity
provision to their customers. While we will also analyze deposit growth per se,
our main regressions explain the difference between loan growth and deposit
growth. By using this variable, we consider banks’ net liquidity provision
to their customers, either through positive loan growth or through negative
deposit growth.
5 In unreported regressions, we actually find that bank loans increase in (instrumented)
bank deposits).
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We will run the following regressions with fixed effects at the bank and year
levels:
Net lendingB,t = β × ∆log(Tourists)B,t + αB + αt + ϵB,t (1)
where the dependent variable is the difference between the loan growth and
deposit growth of bank B in year t, and the main explanatory variable is the
growth of tourists’ overnight stays in the ski resorts where bank B’s branches
are located. For details regarding these variables, see the following section. The
explanatory variable is a proxy for tourists’ demand for accommodation and
other services in the municipalities where bank B has branches. Of course,
this variable will also vary for reasons other than weather-induced demand
shocks. For example, there is a potential for reverse causality because hotels’
pricing policies may depend on their liquidity needs. We can, however, safely
assume that tourists’ overnight stays are not directly linked to variation in
bank deposits or loans because tourists typically demand no banking services
other than ATMs. This implies that, by making sure that we identify shocks to
tourists’ demand for overnight stays, we will measure effects of these shocks on
banks that exist due to the impact of the shocks on the finances of businesses
and households close to the ski resorts.
We address the identification problem by using data about ski resorts’ snow
conditions in order to construct an instrumental variable. The construction of
this variable will be described in detail in the following section. For now, it
suffices to point out that the snow conditions are essentially unpredictable a
year ahead so that our instrument really identifies shocks given that we use
annual data. To interpret these shocks as liquidity shocks, we must, however,
rule out that our instrument proxies for shocks to investment opportunities
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that could also affect bank deposits and loans. To weaken this identifying
assumption, we use fixed effects as catch-all control variables. For example, our
bank-level fixed effects should control for changes in investment opportunities
due to climate change. In essence, we assume that the economic agents behind
our data view weather risk as a risk of temporary shocks which mainly affect
their liquidity needs, but contain no new information that could affect the
agents’ views of their investment opportunities.
Regressions similar to the above-stated one will be used to analyze interbank
lending and borrowing. The dependent variable of these regressions is the dif-
ference between the growth rate of a bank B’s loans to other banks and that
of the banks loans from other banks. We refer to this difference as net inter-
bank lending. We will test whether banks allow for their interbank lending
to be “crowded out” by their liquidity provision to non-bank customers when
these customers are affected by weather-induced liquidity shocks. In this case,
we should observe that the regressions explaining net interbank lending dif-
fer from the above-stated regression in terms of the sign of the coefficient of
(instrumented) tourists’ overnight stays.
3 Institutional background
3.1 The Austrian hotel industry
Ski tourism is an important sector of the Austrian economy. According to
Statistics Austria (2018) in 2017 the tourism industry accounted for 6.4% of
the GDP directly and 15.3% of GDP indirectly6. Ski tourism is an especially
important part of the Austrian Tourism industry. In the state of Tirol, a
state famous for its many ski resorts, 17.5% of the GDP can be attributed to
6 This calculation takes into account value added by the supply chains of the touristic firms
which is not captured by the first statistic.
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tourism. In contrast, in Upper Austria, a state with fewer ski resorts, only 4%
of the GDP is created by tourism (see Tirol Tourism Research (2018)).
Tourism firms in ski resorts cater to tourists whose demand depends on the
snow conditions in the resorts. Töglhofer, Eigner, and Prettenthaler (2011)
analyze panel data about 185 Austrian ski resorts and find that an unexpected
change in snow conditions by one standard deviation changes the number of
tourists’ overnight stays in nearby hotels by 0.6-1.9%. The typical firm in the
Austrian tourism industry is a small and family owned hotel or restaurant.
Doerflinger, Doerflinger, Gavac, and Vogl (2013) show that 93% of all firms in
the tourism industry are family owned. Given the size of Austrian hotels, it
is highly unlikely that they place a bond or issue public equity. As relatively
small and family-owned firms, the firms in our sample depend mostly on bank
debt as source of outside financing. If the firms receive outside equity, it is
typically from relatives.7 Hotels can use their buildings and land as collateral
when borrowing from banks. These firms usually have long going banking
relationships with a house-bank and depend heavily on the bank for all kinds
of financial services.
Hotels have limited ability to financially hedge the risk of a shortage in snow.
To the best of our knowledge, there were no insurance products available, with
which hotels could have insured the risk of a bad winter.8 The most popular
way how ski resorts manage their exposure to weather risk is by creating arti-
ficial snow. The prevalence of snow cannons in Austria grew throughout our
sample period. According to an Austrian newspaper report (see Salzburger
Nachrichten (2015)), in 2007 there existed 3,100 snow cannons in entire Eu-
rope versus 19,000 snow cannons in Austria alone in 2015. However, there
exist technical and legal limits for the production and use of artificial snow.
7 Loans from relatives are also treated as equity investments under Austrian bankruptcy
law.
8 Likewise, according to survey data from 2006 weather derivatives were primarily used by
energy companies.Barrieu and Scaillet (2010)
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The time span in which artificial snow can be produced is legally restricted.9
The production is particularly intensive in water and energy. Water is taken
mainly from water reservoirs especially constructed to supply the snow can-
nons. The use of artificial snow is therefore costly for the ski resorts, which are
usually owned by the municipalities connected to the ski resort and by a group
of hotels located in the ski resort. Despite the legal and economical limits of
artificial snow, its rise throughout our sample period might bias the estimates
in our first stage regression of equation 1 towards zero, as the natural snow
levels lose importance for tourists’ ability to ski.
3.2 The Austrian banking industry
Like Germany, Austria has a “three-pillar” banking sector, consisting of private
banks (stock corporations), savings banks, and cooperative banks. Throughout
the paper, we refer to the latter two groups as “local banks”. The groups of sav-
ings banks and cooperative banks operate within group-specific institutional
frameworks, featuring joint supervisory institutions and deposit insurance, as
well as lead banks that provide the groups with access to the wider financial
markets. Within-group competition between banks is quite limited, but there
is a healthy level of between-group competition. In terms of population size
per bank branch, Austria remains among the most competitive countries in the
European Union.10 In terms of total assets, the savings banks have a market
share of about 20% while the cooperative banks have a share of about 30%
(Bülbül, Schmidt, and Schüwer (2014)).
In terms of ownership links, the groups of savings and cooperative banks are
separate parts of the Austrian banking sector, but there are complex cross-
ownership structures within the groups. The groups feature internal equity
capital markets. For example, the savings banks’ lead bank, Erste Bank, is
9 In the state of Tirol, for example, ski resorts in low altitudes are allowed to use snow
cannons from November until the end of March.
10 See Table 9.2 in ECB (2017).
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partly owned by other savings banks. The internal equity markets are also key
to resolving cases of financial distress. Distressed banks are typically saved
through mergers with other banks in the same group.
As in Germany, the banks within a group also assist each other in their lending,
e.g., by making joint loans.11 This practice complements the groups’ internal
equity markets. To avoid that a lack of equity capital constrains an individual
bank’s lending, the bank can either obtain equity capital from other banks in
the same group or make a joint loan together with the other banks. In the
latter case, the banks’ joint equity capital must be sufficient in order to meet
regulatory equity capital requirements. Throughout our sample period, the
Austrian banks were subject to equity capital requirements according to Basel
I until 2007 and Basel II after 2007.
The Austrian banking market is one of the most competitive banking markets
in the European Union (see ECB (2017)). There exist a large number of small
banks, many of which only operate on a regional level. This limits their ability
to diversify regional risks by pooling clients from different regions. Hence, in
general, regional shocks to the banks’ clients should transmit to the banks
and, more specifically, regional snow shocks should be visible at the bank
level because touristic firms represent an important part of the local economy.
Banks’ deposits should vary with the financial strength of their clients. After
a good winter the ski hotels’ deposits at their banks should increase because
they experienced a successful winter season. In contrast, after a bad winter,
ski hotels are likely to withdraw funds from their deposit accounts in order to
finance the losses they inquired throughout the winter season.
4 Data
11 For further discussion with respect to German savings banks, see DSGV (2012).
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Bank data. All Bank level data are retrieved from the Austrian National
Bank (ANB). The final data set is constructed by combining two independent
data sets on (i) the banks’ branch networks and (ii) their annual statements.
First, for branch network data, we have access to the full list of individual bank
branches of Austrian banks for every year separately between the years 1998
to 2012. This data set comprises information on the location of the branches,
and it contains the structure which links the individual branches to the banks.
12
Second, we obtain the annual statements of all banks which operated in Austria
between the years 1998 to 2016. The annual statements are reported on the
website of the ANB, and contain all information from banks’ balance sheets.
The two data sets are merged using the banks’ sort codes and the respective
year. We use the structure of the branch network and aggregate the balance
sheet data for all branches with different sort codes that belong to the same
bank.
The final data set contains the universe of banks which operated in Austria
between the years 1998 and 2012. Over the whole sample period, we observe
6,144 distinct bank branches which belong to 713 banks. As depicted in figure
1, both the number of banks and the number of branches display a similar
trend over time. They peak in the beginning of the sample period in 1999
(banks) and 2002 (branches), followed by a decline thereafter.13
Tourism data. Data about tourism in Austria are obtained from Statistics
Austria. Statistics Austria provides information on the number of tourists’ ar-
rivals in municipalities and the number of nights accommodation that tourists
12 Note, that in Austria it is possible and common, that banks’ branches operate using
different bank sort codes.
13 Note, however, that both numbers are still relatively stable over time. The difference
between maximum and the minimum of the number of banks is less than 10% of the
maximum number of banks.
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stayed at hotels in a municipality. This data is separately reported for the
winter season and the summer season.14 We have tourism data for 1976 mu-
nicipalities in Austria for the years 1972 to 2012.
Snow data. The Austrian Meteorological Office (AMO) reports weather
data for each of their 131 weather stations throughout Austria. We obtain
monthly data on the weather stations for the years from 1972 to 2013. For
our snow data, the definition of a year deviates from that of a calendar year.
To not tear apart a winter season, we define “season-year” t to start with the
first of November of calendar year t − 1 and end with the 31st of October in
calendar year t.
For each weather stations, we define a dummy variable which measures whether
it was possible to ski on a given day. This “Snow Day” dummy equals one
if the snow level exceeded 10 centimeters at the time of measurement, and
zero else. The total number of snow days during the winter season, denoted
Snow dayss,t, is defined as the sum of the “Snow Day” dummies for all days of
the winter season, i.e. all days of the months November till April.
Using the snow data and the location of the weather stations, we construct a
variable similar to Snow dayss,t for every Austrian municipality. This variable
is as a linear combination of snow data of the five weather stations, which are
located the closest to the municipalities.
The information of these weather stations are not weighted equally. We as-
sume that the closer the weather stations are located to the municipality, the
more informative they are about the actual snow coverage in the municipality.
Therefore, we weight the information of station s by wm,s, which decreases as
the distance between the weather station and the municipality dist(s, m) in-
14 The definition of the winter season used by the Austrian Statistics Office is the same as
our definition of the winter season, i.e. the months from November till April.
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creases. The weight is defined as wm,s = 1/dist(s, m).15 We define the number







Matching the data. We use the information about the location of a Bank’s
branches and match the snow data and the tourism data of the respective loca-
tions to the branches. Subsequently, we aggregate the branch level information
about tourism and snow to the bank level. We drop financial institutions from
our sample, which do not share the business model of a consumer bank. These
institutions include the Austrian National Bank, all institutions such as com-
pany pension funds in the “Sonderbanken” sector, and building societies. For
a detailed description of the data match and the aggregation, see subsections
4.1.1 and 4.1.2. We end up with a bank-year panel data set covering 653 banks
in Austria for the years 1999 until 2016.
4.1 Definition of variables
4.1.1 Bank level Tourism
We link the tourism data of municipality m to a bank’s branch by using the
official key of the municipality where the branch is located. We construct a
bank-level measure of exposure to tourism by aggregating the snow data of all
the municipalities in which bank B is active in year t, i.e. runs a branch. The
variable is defined as:






where Im,B,t is an indicator variable equaling one if bank B operates at least
one branch in municipality m in year t and zero else. Nightswm,t denotes the
number of nights accommodation that tourists spend in municipality m during
year t’s winter season.
4.1.2 Bank level Snow
Similar to the construction of bank level tourism, we link the snow data of
municipality m in year t’s winter season to a bank’s branch by using the official
key of the municipality where the branch is located. We construct a measure of
snow exposure of bank B by aggregating the snow data of all municipalities in






Snow daysm,t denotes the number of snow days in municipality m during year
t’s winter season as defined in equation 2.
4.1.3 Net lending
All dependent variables are constructed by data obtained from banks’ balance
sheets. For more detailed information on the bank data, see 4. Bank B’s
deposits in year t are defined as the savings accounts by non-bank customers
in year t’s balance sheet. We distinguish between loans granted by Bank B
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to (i) its customers and to (ii) other banks. The variable loans to customers
is defined as the sum of banks’ outstanding claims against their (non-bank)
customers as reported on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets in year t.
The variable loans to banks is defined similarly for banks’ claims against other
banks. In addition, we define loans from banks as the amount outstanding
which bank B owes to other banks at the reporting of year t. When we analyze
loans to banks, we further differentiate between short-term loans, which are
payable on demand, and loans granted on a longer term , which are not payable
on demand.16
We construct two ratios which describe banks’ net lending to non-bank cus-
tomers, Net lending, and banks’ net interbank lending, Net lendingIB:












In our analysis, we use two modified versions of Net lendingIBB,t for which we
substitute loans to banks with short term and long term loans to banks.
4.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables in our analysis. We split
the overall standard deviation into a between and a within component. The
between component reflects pure cross-sectional variation between the banks
in our sample. In contrast, the within component measures only the variation
over time. To account for outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1% level
at both tails of the distribution.
16 Given out data, we cannot draw a more detailed distinction between short term and long
term loans.
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The first six variables that we report are the variables from which we construct
the dependent variables, i.e bank-level amounts of deposits and loans. For all
of these variables, the majority of the standard deviation stems from variation
between different banks, which is not surprising, as our data set covers a large
number of smaller banks, that operate on a local level only, and a few larger
banks, which run a nation-wide branch network. The within standard devia-
tion for the six variables is however substantial, i.e. it exceeds the arithmetic
mean for 5 of the 6 variables and amounts for roughly a quarter to a third of
the overall standard deviation of the variables.
The average bank in our sample reports savings deposits of 247.78 million
Euros and a loan portfolio to non-bank customers of about 706 million Euros in
their balance sheets. The Loan portfolio for loans obtained from and granted
to other financial institutions amounts for 332.57 million Euros and 226.37
million Euros. The majority of the loans to other financial institutions are not
payable on demand, i.e. classified as longer term loans.
The tourist exposure of the average bank is 1.23 millions, as measured by
nights accommodation during the winter season. The average firm has a snow
exposure of 191.7 snow days during the winter season. Both numbers vary
substantially from one bank to another, as some banks operate only locally
whereas others operate on a nationwide level. The within component of the
standard deviation of tourist exposure (1.43 millions) and snow days (145.2)
are also high. The variation can come from two sources: (i) variation over
time in the number of nights accommodation and snow days in Austrian mu-
nicipalities, and, (ii) changes in exposure introduced by changes in the banks
branch network over time. Analyzing the raw data about nights accommoda-
tion (snow days), we find that the within variation accounts for 43% (68%) of
the overall standard deviation, i.e. changes in banks’ branch network do not
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further amplify the within variation in nights accommodation and snow days
observed in the raw data.
5 Results
5.1 Banks’ deposits and net lending to non-bank cus-
tomers
In this subsection, we are interested in the effect of liquidity shocks caused
by demand from tourists on bank level deposits and banks’ lending policy to
non-bank customers. Table 2 reports results for regressions of deposit growth
on growth of the bank level exposure to tourists (in column 1 and 4) and snow
(3). For all variables, i.e. deposits, number of tourists’ overnight stays, and
snow days, we use the first difference of the logarithm, i.e. the logarithmic
growth rates in the regressions. In column 1, we regress deposit growth on
the growth of tourists’ overnight stays. We find a positive and significant
relationship between deposit growth and the growth of bank level exposure to
tourists. A 10 percentage point increase in the bank level exposure to tourists
is associated with a 2.1 percentage points increase in deposits. In column 2,
we report results for the reduced form regression of deposit growth on the
growth of snow days. As in the OLS specification, the result is positive and
significant. A 10 percentage point increase in bank level exposure to snow
causes a 1 percentage point increase in deposits.
In column 3, we report results for the first stage regression of tourists overnight
stays on snow. The results are comparable to those reported in Töglhofer
et al. (2011). We find that the F-statistic for the significance of the excluded
instruments is higher than the “rule of thumb” cutoff of 10 (see Staiger and
Stock (1997)) and the most conservative cutoff of 16.38 suggested by Stock
and Yogo (2005). Therefore, we conclude that this analysis does not suffer
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from weak identification. In column 4, we report results of the second stage
regression of deposit growth on the growth of tourists’ overnight stays. The
estimate of the IV regression is also positive and significant. However, the
magnitude of the IV coefficient is about 10 times higher when compared to
the coefficient of the OLS regression, suggesting that the variable Tourists is
endogenous.17 A one percentage point exogenous increase in the number of
tourists’ overnight stays causes a 2.5% growth in deposits.
Next, we analyze how banks translate the deposits into loans to non-bank
customers. Table 3 reports results in which the dependent variable is the
difference in loan and deposit growth rates. In column 1, we present results for
an OLS regression. We do not find a systematic relation between the number
of tourists’ overnight stays and the difference in loan and deposit growth rates.
Column 2 and 4 report results for the reduced form and the IV regressions in
which we regress the difference in loan and deposit growth rates on snow. In
both specifications, we find a negative and significant effect of snow on the
difference in loan and deposit growth rates, i.e. banks increase their lending to
customers (relative to their deposits from the customers) when deteriorating
snow conditions lead to less tourists in ski resorts.18 The effect is economically
significant. When analyzing the IV coefficient in column 4, a one standard
deviation decrease in tourist growth leads to an increase in the dependent
variable by half a standard deviation. We interpret this finding as follows:
Banks provide liquidity to their (non-bank) customers in the ski resorts when
they need it the most, i.e. years in which there is few snow and there are only
few tourists.
17 In fact, we can reject exogeneity of tourists’ overnight stays in an endogeneity test with a
p-value of 1%.
18 Again, we can reject exogeneity of tourists’ overnight stays in an endogeneity test with a
p-value of 1%.
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5.2 Interbank borrowing and lending
In this subsection, we are interested in the effect of liquidity shocks caused
by demand from tourists on the interbank borrowing and lending activities by
banks. Table 4 reports results for similar regressions as in subsection 5.1 for
net interbank lending. Our main dependent variable net interbank lending is
defined as the difference between the growth rate of a bank’s loans to other
banks and that of the bank’s loans from other banks. We do not find a signifi-
cant relation between net interbank lending and the number of tourists in the
OLS specification in column 1. In the reduced form specification in column
2, we find a positive and significant effect of snow on net interbank lending.
We find the same effect in the IV specification in column 4: Banks perform
less net interbank lending in bad winters with few tourists in ski resorts. A 10
percentage point decrease in banks’ exposure to tourists causes a 8.6 percent-
age points decrease in net interbank lending. This pattern is consistent with
our hypothesis that banks’ net interbank lending is “crowded out” by their
liquidity insurance to non-bank customers during bad winters.
We distinguish between short-term and long-term net lending to other banks.
The results of a similar set of regressions as in the previous analysis are reported
in tables 5 and 6. We find that it is the long-term and not the short-term
net lending to other banks which is crowded out by net lending to non-bank
customers during bad winters. This is consistent with the idea that banks use
the interbank market to take on capital in order to provide liquidity insurance
to their non-bank customers.
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6 Cross-sectional variation in net lending
6.1 Local banks
In this subsection, we test whether there exist differences between local and
non-local banks in the provision of liquidity insurance for non-bank customers
and the lending activity on the interbank market. We exploit the “three-
pillar” system of the Austrian banking market and define local banks as the
group of savings banks and cooperative banks.19 In contrast to the other
banks, local banks operate on a strictly regional basis only. Not surprisingly,
local banks are, on average, smaller than the remaining banks as measured by
total assets and the number of branches. Following the idea of Stein (2002)
and DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell (2004), because they are small, local banks
might be particularly good in processing soft information about their small and
informationally opaque customers in ski resorts. Therefore, we suspect mainly
these banks to engage in relationship lending, and to be the main providers of
liquidity insurance to non-bank customers.
Table 7 reports estimates of the second stage IV regressions in which we regress
different dependent variables on bank level exposure to tourists. Exposure to
tourists is instrumented by exposure to snow. The dependent variables are
net lending to non-bank customers (column 1 and 2), net interbank lending
(column 3 and 4), short-term net interbank lending (column 5 and 6), and
long-term net interbank lending (column 7 and 8). The pattern of results
in table 7 is consistent with this notion. In column 2 we find that only lo-
cal banks provide its non-bank customers with liquidity insurance during bad
years. Net interbank lending is negatively affected by the number of tourists
only at local banks (see column 4 and 8 for long-term net interbank lending).
This is consistent with the idea, that local banks borrow on the interbank
19 For a discussion of the Austrian banking market, see 3.2
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market in order to provide liquidity insurance to their non-bank customers.
Next, we test for the significance in the difference between local and non-local
banks. In table 8, we report results of an IV regression in which we instru-
ment ∆log(Tourists) and ∆log(Tourists)×Local bank with ∆log(Snow) and
∆log(Snow) × Local bank. For net lending to non-bank customers, we find
that the growth rate sensitivity to tourists is significantly lower at local banks.
For (long-term) net interbank lending, the growth rate sensitivity to tourists
is significantly higher at local banks.20 We conclude that only for local banks,
net interbank lending is crowded out by the provision of liquidity to non-bank
customers during bad winters.
6.2 Bank capitalization
In this subsection, we test whether the capitalization of banks matters for net
lending to non-bank customers and net interbank lending. The capitalization
of banks is measured by the equity ratio of the bank lagged by one year. In
table 9, we perform sample splits between bank-year with lagged equity ratios
lower (L) and higher (H) than the median. We find that only the highly
capitalized banks increase their net lending to their non-bank customers and
decrease their net interbank lending (both short-term and long-term) in bad
years. This pattern is consistent with the idea, that banks with sufficient
capitalization borrow on the interbank market in order to provide liquidity
insurance to their non-bank customers. In table 10, we test for a difference in
β in equation 1 for banks with high and low capitalization. We do not find
a significant interaction effect in any of the specifications. However, all the
regressions suffer from weak identification as the F-test of excluded instruments
in the first stage is below one. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret the results
in table 10.
20 The first stage F-statistic meets the criteria of Stock and Yogo (2005) for the desired
maximal size of the Wald test of 0.2.
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6.3 Snow risk
In this subsection, we test whether snow risk has an effect on the provision
of liquidity insurance for non-bank customers and the lending activity in the
interbank market. Snow risk is defined as the standard deviation of SnowB,t
as defined in equation 4 across the entire sample period. The idea is that
banks that face high levels of snow risk are hit more often by snow-induced
liquidity shocks, which might limit their ability to provide insurance to their
non-bank customers. In fact, in table 11, we find that only the banks that
face relatively low levels of snow risks are the ones which provide liquidity
insurance to their non-bank customers and perform less net interbank lending
in bad years. However, we do not find the coefficients to be significantly
different in table 12. 21
6.4 Branch network diversification
In this subsection, we analyze the effect of the geographical diversification of
a bank’s branch network on the provision of liquidity insurance for non-bank
customers and the lending activity on the interbank market. The idea is the
following: The more geographically diversified the branch network of a bank
is, the less the bank is hit by local snow-induced liquidity shocks. Therefore,
a branch network diversification might foster the bank’s ability to provide
liquidity insurance to its non-bank customers. Branch network diversification





(latn,B,t − latB,T )2 + (lonn,B,t − lonB,t)2
(7)
21 Again, all the regressions suffer from weak identification as the F-test of excluded instru-
ments in the first stage is below one. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret the results in
table 12.
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where n indexes the branches of bank B. The hypothetical mid-branch location
is given by latB,T and lonB,T which are defined as the average latitude and
longitude of all of bank B’s branches in year t.
We define a bank’s branch network to be highly diversified if the geographical
expansion of its branch network is larger than that of the median bank.
The results in table 13 suggest that banks with highly diversified branch net-
works (as reported in columns labeled H) are the banks which provide liquidity
insurance to its non-bank customers during bad years. The same banks en-
gage in less net interbank lending in these years. Again, we do not find the
coefficients to be significantly different in table 14.22
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrate that banks provide liquidity insurance to their
non-bank customers when hit by an exogenous liquidity shock. In contrast,
banks net interbank borrowing is negatively affected by the liquidity shocks,
i.e. banks borrow more than they lend in bad years. In other words, lending
to other banks is “crowded out” by banks’ provision of liquidity insurance to
their non-bank customers. We find that this is the case for long-term but not
for short-term net interbank lending.
In addition, we document cross-sectional variation in this finding. The insur-
ance provision to non-bank customers in bad years comes from local banks,
banks for which capitalization is sufficiently high, banks facing relatively low
snow risk, and banks whose branch network is sufficiently diversified geograph-
ically. The same banks decrease their net interbank lending, or, in other words
increase their net interbank borrowing in bad years.
22 However, all the regressions suffer from weak identification as the F-test of excluded
instruments in the first stage is below one. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret the results
in table 14.
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By focusing on weather-induced risk, the papers in this thesis add to the
literature on economic adaptation to climate change. Due to climate change,
negative snow induced shocks are expected to happen more frequently in the
future. We show that banks are an important source of liquidity, and, therefore,
an important source of stability for small firms in the tourism industry. This
finding generalizes to other small firms in weather dependent industries.
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Figure 1: Branch network over time
This figure depicts the number of bank branches (solid line) and banks (dashed) over the




























Table 1: Summary statistics
This table reports the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum, the maximum and the
number of observations for the variables of interest. The data set has a bank-year panel
structure. We split the overall standard deviation into a between and a within component.
The between component reflects pure cross-sectional variation between the hotels in our
sample. We winsorize 1% on both ends of the distribution for all continuous variables.
Variable Category Mean SD Min Max Obs
Deposits (mio.) overall 247.78 807.97 0 7043.48 9802
between 736.81 653
within 214.09 15
Loans to customers (mio.) overall 706.02 3290.95 0 27654.15 9802
between 3106.66 653
within 801.57 15
Loans to banks (mio.) overall 226.37 1047.66 0 8833.77 9802
between 986.79 653
within 321.18 15
Loans from banks (mio.) overall 332.57 1882.75 0 16127.17 9802
between 1782.77 653
within 522.96 15
Short term loans to banks (mio.) overall 51.41 182.14 0 1581.57 9802
between 165.61 653
within 71.16 15
Long term loans to banks (mio.) overall 170.61 861.91 0 7281.33 9802
between 805.68 653
within 284 15
Tourists (in thousands) overall 1231.78 4650.05 0 37209.78 6147
between 4198.36 586
within 1426.18 10.49
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































How does small-firm employment respond to labor productivity risk?
We show that this depends on the equity capital of local banks. Our
analysis is based on a truly quasi-experimental setting. We use highly
granular data about a sample of small firms employing workers whose
productivity depends on the weather. The data allow us to cleanly iden-
tify the causal effect of labor productivity risk on the firms’ employment.
We find that an increase in the risk of transitory productivity shocks
reduces firms’ willingness to commit to employing workers. This effect
is stronger if local banks have less equity capital. It appears that a lack
of bank equity reduces firms’ capacity to take labor productivity risk.
Our evidence also highlights that bank capitalization matters for eco-
nomic adaptation to climate change by reducing the effects of increased
weather variability on small-firm employment.
“making finance flows [...] consistent with climate-resilient development.”
from Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, UNFCCC (2016)
1 Introduction
It is widely believed that the depth of the Great Recession was amplified by
a combination of risk with financial frictions.1 This toxic combination has
since been the subject of a growing literature. The literature analyzes how the
financial system fails firms and their owners when they need it to manage an
increase in risk, and how this failure affects the firms’ workers and the wider
economy. In a recent contribution Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2019) show that
they can match the contraction in employment and output observed during the
Great Recession using a model in which firms take risk when they hire workers,
promising them pay before they generate uncertain revenues. In the model, a
contraction is triggered by an increase in the volatility of worker productivity.
This occurs against the backdrop of capital market imperfections and agency
problems that increase the cost of holding cash as a way to insure against
liquidity shocks. A related model with different financial frictions appears in
Quadrini (2017).2
This paper analyzes effects of exogenous changes in labor productivity risk in-
duced by weather risk, based on a sample of firms exposed to climate change.3
The firms are hotels in Austrian ski resorts. The productivity of their work-
ers depends on skiers’ demand for accommodation and, hence, on the snow
conditions. We analyze how the firms’ employment responds to variation in
snow risk across years and across the weeks of the skiing season. The variation
across years is particularly pronounced in ski resorts at high levels of altitude,
1 For example, see Stock and Watson (2012).
2 See the next section for a discussion of the related literature.
3 The effect of the weather on labor productivity is the subject of a literature surveyed by
Dell, Jones, and Olken (2014).
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where snow risk increased due to a warming climate.4 Our analysis identifies
employment effects of variation in snow risk as a cause of labor productivity
risk that the firms in our sample were clearly aware of.5
Our sample also allows us to distinguish between two types of labor produc-
tivity risk, i.e., those caused by the risks of a transitory and permanent lack of
snow. At the start of the skiing season, snow risk is a risk of transitory negative
shocks, but it is a risk of permanent negative shocks at the season’s end. Our
analysis starts with tests concerning the effects of the different snow shocks
on the firms’ employment. We document that, while the firms fire workers in
response to permanent negative snow shocks, their employment is quasi-fixed
with respect to transitory shocks.6 We then focus on the risk of the latter
shocks and find that, even though the shocks have no direct effects, the firms’
employment responds to changes in the risk of these shocks. In essence, the
firms behave like those in the models of Quadrini (2017) and Arellano et al.
(2019): At times of higher risk, they employ fewer workers because they an-
ticipate that, due to a transitory lack of snow, the workers might not be able
to “earn their pay”.
While we cannot directly observe the reasons for the risk aversion the firms
exhibit in their hiring decisions, we test for effects of variables describing the
risk-taking capacity of local banks. In this respect, our research strategy is mo-
tivated by the analysis of Holmström and Tirole (1998). They show that firms
benefit from insurance against liquidity shocks provided by financial interme-
diaries, but agency problems can limit the optimal extent of this insurance
provision, hence reducing firm size.7 For the firms in our sample, the relevant
4 See Section 5.2.1.
5 This allows us to relate our results to predictions of models in which firms respond to
changes in labor productivity risk.
6 This is consistent with prior findings of Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005) and follow-
up papers. In contrast to the prior literature, we can avoid identifying assumptions
required to identify permanent and transitory shocks.
7 Also, investments with a positive net present value may not be feasible without bank
liquidity creation (Donaldson, Piacentino and Thakor (2018)).
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liquidity shocks are the losses caused by a transitory lack of snow in ski resorts.
As discussed above, the risk of these losses reduces firm size measured in terms
of employment. We next test whether the strength of this effect depends on
proxies for the risk-taking capacity of local banks.8 The main result is evidence
for an effect of bank capitalization that was not previously documented. We
find that a lack of bank equity strengthens the negative effect of labor produc-
tivity risk on the firms’ employment. As discussed below, this evidence results
from instrumental-variables estimates that allow us to specifically talk about
labor productivity risk (rather than snow risk). Our evidence is consistent
with the idea that banks’ capital structures affect their capacity to provide
firms with liquidity insurance.9 This insurance appears to be important for
firms whose employment is quasi-fixed with respect to (transitory) shocks to
worker productivity.
By focusing on weather-induced risk, we add to the literature on economic
adaptation to climate change. Our evidence suggests that adverse effects of
weather risk on employment are more pronounced if banks lack equity capi-
tal. Given that weather risk is a risk of rather verifiable shocks, it should in
principle be well-suited for risk-sharing between small firms and their banks.
By pooling the risks of many small firms in their vicinity, banks can realize
economies of scale in risk management. Our results suggest that banks’ perfor-
mance as risk-sharing partners of small firms depends on their equity capital.
As a consequence, banks’ capital structure policies and their risk management
8 See Elsas and Krahnen (1998) for evidence that firms in Germany rely on their house-
banks for liquidity insurance. We use data about Austrian firms. The banking sectors of
Austria and Germany operate in similar ways. For further information, see Section 3.2.
9 In the framework of Holmström and Tirole (1998), the effect of equity capital can be
formalized of as an effect of a (shadow) cost of liquidity insurance. For example, consider
the simple model in Section 5.3.1. of Tirole (2006), where financial intermediaries incur
no cost when they inject liquidity into a firm. Adding a cost parameter κ to the model
reveals that this parameter modulates the effect of liquidity risk on the optimal firm size,
I = A/(1 − ρ0 + (1 + κ)λρ), where A denotes the firm’s equity capital, ρ0 measures the
extent to which agency costs limit the pledgeability of the firm’s final payoff, and λ is the
probability of a liquidity shock, ρI, that must be financed at an intermediate stage.
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should be on the agenda for “making finance flows [...] consistent with climate-
resilient development” (UNFCCC (2016)).10
The next section discusses our contributions to the related literature. In the
remainder of this section, we further describe our analysis and discuss its ex-
ternal validity. By focusing on hotels in Austrian ski resorts, we use a sample
of firms whose assets have a readily identifiable physical location linked to
specific climate-related risks.11 The sample includes 16,587 firms. We combine
data about the firms’ employment spells during the years 1977-2011 with high-
resolution data about the ski resorts’ snow levels during the years 1978-2006.
An exploratory analysis shows that ski resorts at higher levels of altitude expe-
rienced pronounced increases in snow risk.12 Our analysis exploits the variation
in this risk across years and weeks of the skiing season. The high granular-
ity of the data allows for using firm-year fixed effects as a control variables.13
The fixed effects control for variation across years in firms’ risk-taking when
they commit to quasi-fixed labor costs, e.g. due to changes in firms’ capital
structures, or local labor market tightness. We thus obtain particularly clean
estimates of the effect of labor productivity risk on employment.
While we focus on a rather special sample of firms, we consider an issue that is
generally relevant given the view of Knight (1971) that firms are institutions
insuring workers against transitory labor productivity shocks: The firms may
10 See Krogstrup and Oman (2019) and Campiglio, Dafermos, Monnin, Ryan-Collins, Schot-
ten, and Tanaka (2018) for surveys of the emerging literature regarding climate finance
and financial regulation. For a discussion of “green” bank capital regulation, see HLEG
(2018) and Thomä and Hilke (2018).
11 Samples like this are commonly used in microeconometric analyses of effects of climate
change. For a survey, see Dell et al. (2014).
12 At above-median altitudes, snow risk increased by 42% during a period of 25 years (1982-
2006). One advantage of our sample period ending in the year 2006 is that it excludes
more recent years in which most Austrian ski resorts installed snow cannons in order to
produce artificial snow.
13 Our results come from weekly data. In fact, we report separate estimate for different parts
of the skiing season. We thus even control for some within-firm-year variation. Below,
we refer to the firm-year fixed effects as firm-season fixed effects because we distinguish
between skiing seasons rather than calendar years.
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themselves need some insurance against liquidity shocks.14 To set the stage for
analyzing this issue, we test whether the firms in our sample actually insure
their workers against weather-induced labor productivity risk. If so, their
employment should not depend on weekly variation in snow conditions. When
we test this hypothesis, we find that the snow conditions do actually affect the
ski hotels’ employment during the ending weeks of the skiing season, but not
during the starting weeks. These findings are consistent with evidence in Guiso
et al. (2005) that firms fully insure their workers against transitory productivity
shocks, but not against more permanent shocks. During the ending weeks of
the skiing season, the snow-induced labor productivity risk is clearly a risk of
permanent shocks. During the starting weeks, it instead is a risk of transitory
shocks. With respect to the latter shocks, the ski hotels’ employment appears
to be quasi-fixed.
We next focus on the starting weeks of the skiing season. It turns out that,
during these weeks, the ski hotels’ employment responds to the risk of transi-
tory snow shocks even though the shocks have no direct effects. This evidence
results from a proxy for the snow risk in a ski resort during a given week (e.g.,
the week before Christmas) that measures the variation in this resort-week’s
snow conditions during the last five years.15 This proxy represents information
available prior to the start of a skiing season. It appears that the firms respond
to this information when they enter into employment contracts: An increase in
14 Financial constraints may in fact induce firms to use more flexible types of employment.
This is analyzed in Caggese and Cuñat (2008) and follow-up papers. As discussed above,
we control for such financial constraints by using firm-year fixed effects.
15 The same measure is used in our explanatory analysis to document that ski resorts at
higher altitudes experienced pronounced increases in snow risk during our sample period.
Given these trends, the firms expectations about snow risk should depend on the snow
conditions they observed during more recent years because the firms should be aware of
the trends.
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snow risk by one standard deviation reduces firm-level employment by about
3%.16
Our results regarding the effect of bank equity come from regressions in which
we interact our proxy for snow risk with the average equity ratio of the banks
in the vicinity of a ski resort. We use these interaction terms to test whether
bank equity modulates the effect of snow risk on the ski hotels’ employment
during the starting weeks of the skiing season. The test yields first evidence
that bank equity acts as a catalyst for the firms’ risk-taking with respect to
labor productivity risk induced by snow risk: The employment of firms in
areas with less bank equity responds more negatively to snow risk. This effect
is robust to extending our regressions by including other features of the banks
close to a ski resort, e.g., their geographic diversification (branch networks).17
Our main evidence comes from instrumental variables (IV) estimates, address-
ing the problem that we cannot directly observe the extent to which snow risk
induces labor productivity risk. This is a concern because our measures of
bank equity may be correlated with cross-sectional variation in the extent to
which our sample firms face labor productivity risk due to snow risk. The
correlation could be negative (e.g., due to losses incurred by banks with bor-
rowers in high-risk areas), or positive (e.g., due to bank-financed investments
reducing hotels’ exposure to snow risk). As a consequence, it could be in-
appropriate to interpret our OLS estimates as results regarding causal effects
of bank capitalization on the extent to which labor productivity risk affects
employment. Instead, we may be simply observing variation in the effect of
snow risk on labor productivity risk.
16 We find no evidence for a similar effect during the season’s ending weeks. This is consistent
with the evidence that snow risk during the latter weeks is borne by the hotels’ workers
since they simply get laid off when their productivity drops due to a lack of snow for
skiing.
17 See Levine, Lin, and Xie (2020) for a recent analysis of banks’ geographic diversification
on their funding costs.
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The IV estimates are based on an institutional feature of the Austrian banking
sector, i.e., that there are many regional banks that belong to banking groups
with internal capital markets (e.g., the group of savings banks). We use the
– exogenous – variation in the groups’ aggregate equity capital as a proxy for
variation in regional banks’ equity capital.18 Instrumental variables estimates
reveal that this equity capital is indeed endogenous. We, however, again ob-
serve a weaker negative effect of snow risk on employment in areas with more
bank equity, and we can now rule out that this is due to bank equity proxying
for the extent to which snow risk causes exogenous labor productivity risk. Per
basis point of bank equity above its mean, we observe a 1.25% reduction in the
semi-elasticity of employment with respect to snow-induced labor productivity
risk.19
We end this section by discussing the external validity of our results. As
discussed above, the firms in our sample behave according to the predictions of
models that have been validated at both the macro- and the micro-level. This
is reassuring, but specific concerns about the external validity of our results
arise because we focus on seasonal businesses in rural areas and a particular
type of risk.
As seasonal businesses, ski hotels may enjoy a high degree of flexibility in ad-
justing their employment, but they may also face rather tight labor markets
because they operate in rural areas. We therefore investigate the external va-
lidity of our results by testing for effects of labor market tightness. It appears
that, in areas with high labor market tightness, the firms’ employment re-
sponds particularly negatively to risk, and even more so if the local banks lack
equity capital. This is consistent with the idea that bank equity affects firms’
18 Endogeneity of the aggregate equity capital is of little concern since the banking business
in any given ski resort accounts for a negligible share of any banking group’s business.
Differences between the groups in the variation of their aggregate capital affect ski resorts
in different ways because the groups differ in their (aggregate) branch networks.
19 The semi-elasticity equals -13% given the mean value of bank equity.
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capacity to commit to quasi-fixed employment because employment should be
more quasi-fixed in areas with tighter labor markets. The results suggest that
our evidence is generally relevant for firms in industries and regions with tight
labor markets.
A second concern arises because we may be analyzing effects of a labor pro-
ductivity risk that is an unusually clear-cut risk of transitory shocks. This
concern can be raised more generally with respect to labor productivity risk
due to weather risk as a risk that is, by definition, one of transitory shocks.
This risk actually affects many small firms in any economy, e.g., agricultural
or construction businesses. If these firms rely on banks to obtain insurance
against liquidity shocks, our results should in fact be useful for understanding
an important role of banks in economic adaptation to changes in weather risk.
In this respect, our evidence suggests that, by providing firms with liquidity
insurance, the financial sector may be key to stabilizing employment if weather
variability increases due to climate change.
The following section further discusses the related literature. Section 2 de-
scribes our research strategy. Section 3 presents institutional details of the
industry we focus on. Section 4 describes our data sources and descriptive
statistics. Section 5 presents our results. Section 7 concludes.
1.1 Related literature
Our analysis tests the foundations of macro-finance models in which firm-
level employment decreases if the volatility of worker productivity increases.
Arellano et al. (2019) (discussed above) and Quadrini (2017) analyze this effect
based on models in which employers take risk by committing to employing
workers whose productivity is uncertain.20 The models explain employment
20 Other effects of the interaction of uncertainty with financial market frictions are analyzed
for example in Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014), Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek
(2014), Alessandri and Mumtaz (2017), Lhuissier, Tripier, et al. (2016), Alfaro, Bloom,
and Lin (2018).
113
fluctuations at the macro-level as effects of changes in the risk of productivity
shocks that have no direct effects on employment. The quasi-fixed nature
of employment is key because it implies that employers take risk by hiring
employees.21 Financial market frictions affect this risk-taking and, hence, the
way employment responds to changes in risk. We provide corroborating firm-
level evidence, making sure that we really measure effects of changes in the
risk of shocks which have no direct effects on employment (because they are
transitory shocks, like the shocks in the models of Arellano et al. (2019) and
Quadrini (2017)).
Our analysis thus connects two empirical literatures that analyze related phe-
nomena. The first literature analyzes direct effects of shocks on employment,
while the second analyzes effects of risk.22 The papers in the first literature
show that different types of shocks have different effects.23 This implies that
the effects of a risk on employment can only be interpreted conditional on the
results of a prior analysis of the direct effects of the shocks associated with
the risk. Our paper is the first contribution that uses this research strategy.
This is clearly key for testing the micro-foundations of the employment dy-
namics in the macro-finance models of Arellano et al. (2019) and Quadrini
(2017). We provide the first evidence that quasi-fixed employment responds
to changes in risk, making sure that we actually analyze a risk of shocks for
which employment is quasi-fixed.24
21 For contributions regarding the quasi-fixed nature of labor costs, see for example Oi (1962)
and Hamermesh (1989).
22 A survey of the first literature appears in Pagano (2019). For a recent contribution to the
second literature and related references, see Alnahedh, Bhagat, and Obreja (2019).
23 Guiso et al. (2005) propose a convincing strategy for identifying effects of transitory and
persistent shocks, but they do not analyze whether employment responds to variation
in the risk of these shocks. The same identification strategy has been used in follow-up
research, e.g., by Cardoso and Portela (2009) , Kátay (2016), Guertzgen (2014) and Ellul,
Pagano, and Schivardi (2018).
24 In fact, it is only this risk for which we find statistically significant effects of the risk on
employment. More generally, the effects of risk on employment depend on the extent to
which firms can adjust their employment in response to shocks. This must be considered
in order to meaningfully measure effects of risk on employment.
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To the best of our knowledge, we also report the first evidence that banks’ eq-
uity capital affects the response of (quasi-fixed) employment to changes in risk.
The evidence results from variation across relatively local banking markets.25
This is consistent with the notion that small firms’ access to banks is restricted
by exogenous geographical constraints since a firm’s proximity to a bank af-
fects the banks’ access to soft information about the firm’s credit-worthiness
(Petersen and Rajan (2002), Berger et al. (2005)). This idea is central to the
literature on relationship banking.26 By measuring effects of variation in bank
equity across local banking markets (rather than across firms’ actual house-
banks), we avoid potential biases due to endogenous matching of firms and
banks.27 Moreover, our market-level measures of bank equity proxy for firms’
ability to obtain financing through relationships to multiple local banks.28 We
25 We thus complement the analysis of Quadrini (2017) regarding effects of more aggregate
variation in banks’ liabilities.
26 For examples, see Petersen and Rajan (2002), Degryse and Ongena (2005), Agarwal and
Hauswald (2010), and Hauswald and Marquez (2006). For recent evidence, see Nguyen
(2019). Nigro, DeYoung, and Glennon (2008) find that loan default rates increase in
the distance between banks and borrowers. The validity of distance between banks and
borrowers as an instrument for relationship formation is also discussed in Bharath, Dahiya,
Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011). For a formal definition of relationship banking, see Boot
(2000). Surveys of the literature appear in Drucker and Puri (2007), Strahan (2008) ,
Freixas and Rochet (1997), Degryse, Kim, and Ongena (2009), and Srinivasan (2014)
27 Schwert (2018) reports evidence that more bank-dependent firms borrow from banks with
more equity capital. This builds on evidence that such banks can provide firms with a
more stable access to credit/liquidity (Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli (2016)
and Beck, Degryse, De Haas, and Van Horen (2018)). Bouwman (2019) surveys the
literature on bank liquidity creation.
28 With multiple business relationships to banks, firms’ access to (re-)financing may be more
secure with respect to the risk that banks’ lending is affected by bank-level problems. See
Guiso, Detragiache, and Garella (2000), Carletti (2004), and Carletti, Cerasi, and Daltung
(2007).
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also test for effects of the number of banks in an area,29, the market share of
small banks,30 and banks’ geographic diversification.31
The response of employment to changes in the banking landscape and credit
supply is also analyzed in a number of other papers, e.g., Chodorow-Reich
(2013), Benmelech, Bergman, and Seru (2015), Banerjee, Gambacorta, and
Sette (2017), Bentolila, Jansen, and Jimenez (2017), and Nguyen (2019). To
the best of our knowledge, none of these papers attempt to measure effects
of financial frictions on the way employment responds to changes in labor
productivity risk.
2 Research strategy
Our analysis can be motivated by the idea that firms’ expectations about their
access to liquidity insurance determine their risk-taking with respect to risks
that cause liquidity needs (Holmström and Tirole (1998)). We analyze the risk-
taking firms engage in when they hire workers, promising them pay before the
workers generate uncertain revenues. This is based on an implicit assumption
(which will be tested), i.e., that the firms actually commit to paying their
workers, rather than sharing the risk with them. Under this assumption, a
firm’s wage bill is quasi-fixed, determined by the number of workers of the firm.
29 Competition between banks can affect relationship lending and banks’ screening of credit
applicants. Theoretical analyses include Broecker (1990), Petersen and Rajan (1995), Dinc
(2000), Yafeh and Yosha (2002), Boot and Thakor (2000), Marquez (2002), Dell’ariccia
and Marquez (2004), and Hauswald and Marquez (2006). Empirical work include Petersen
and Rajan (1995), Elsas (2005), Black and Strahan (2002), Degryse and Ongena (2007),
Rice and Strahan (2010), Presbitero and Zazzaro (2011), Ogura (2012), and Marco and
Petriconi (2019).
30 Small banks may be better at using soft information in their lending decisions, as posited
in Stein (2002). Related evidence appears for example in Cole, Goldberg, and White
(2004), Berger, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Haubrich (2004), Liberti and Mian (2009),
Cerqueiro, Degryse, and Ongena (2011), Agarwal and Hauswald (2010), Skrastins and Vig
(2018) and Berger, Minnis, and Sutherland (2017). The literature is surveyed by Liberti
and Petersen (2019).
31 Banks’ branch networks clearly determine banks’ ability to cope with local shocks. Banks’
geographic diversification also affects their ability to monitor borrowers (Winton (1999),
Berger et al. (2004)). Related evidence appears for example in Chong (1991), Demsetz
and Strahan (1997), DeLong (2001), Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2006), Akhigbe and
Whyte (2003), Deng and Elyasiani (2008), Goetz (2012), and Goetz (2018).
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With e employees, a firm has to finance a liquidity shock of max(w − ρ, 0)e,
where we is the firm’s wage bill, and ρe is the total revenue generated by the
employees, determined by a random variable ρ that realizes after the firm has
committed to the wage bill.
More generally, the number of employees may affect the riskiness of the rev-
enue per employee due to (dis-)economies of scale. In our sample, this happens
because, as seasonal businesses, the firms regularly experience capacity con-
straints determined by their fixed assets. As the number of workers in a firm
increases, the capacity constraints will at some point limit the firm’s exposure
to labor productivity risk due to exogenous demand shocks. We will therefore
focus on effects of demand shocks during periods when the capacity constraints
are clearly not binding. Moreover, we will focus on the firms’ employment of
a rather homogeneous group of blue-collar workers, i.e., their staff for waiting
tables, cleaning rooms, and other services directly related to ski tourism. The
productivity of these workers depends on ski tourists’ demand, and weather
risk causes labor productivity risk.
A firm in our sample employs workers that generate a revenue ρ = f(s, X),
where s is an exogenous (“snow”) shock and X denotes a set of variables
that determine the firm’s exposure to the shock, i.e., the extent to which the
firm is affected by a given shock. The function f describes the risk a firm
takes when it increases the number of its workers and, thus, its exposure to
snow-induced variation in labor productivity. We want to measure how this
risk-taking depends on characteristics of the banking landscape in the vicinity
of a firm. To do so, we must address two identification problems.
The first problem is that snow risk may be correlated with choice variables
included in the set X. We resolve this problem by using highly granular social
security data in order to analyze firms’ weekly employment with a focus on
effects of variation in snow risk across weeks of the skiing season. Given this
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focus on short-run variation in risk, we can assume that any choice variables
in X are quasi-fixed within firm-years (skiing seasons). This assumption is
realistic, e.g., with respect to investments in fixed assets that would reduce
the firms’ exposure to snow risk.32
The second identification problem concerns the causal effect of the banking
landscape on the way firms’ employment responds to risk. To measure this
effect, we will use the following regression
ln(EDi,t,T ) = β0σj(i),t,T + β1σj(i),t,T × bj(i),T + γZi,t,T + αi,T + αt + ϵi,t,T , (1)
where T indexes years (skiing seasons), t indexes weeks, and i indexes firms
in regions (ski resorts) j(i). The coefficient β0 measures effects of weather risk
σj(i),t(T ) on firm i’s employment EDi,t,T (in employee-days), and the coefficient
β1 measures how the semi-elasticity of employment with respect to weather
risk changes in characteristics of the local banking sector, bj(i),T . For details
regarding these variables, see Section 3. As discussed above, we focus on effects
of short-run variation in weather risk by including firm-year fixed effects αi,T
and week fixed effects αt.
The identification problem concerns the causal interpretation of the coefficient
β1, i.e., the causal effect of bank characteristics bj(i),T on the elasticity of em-
ployment with respect to weather-induced labor productivity risk. Lacking
suitable measures of labor productivity, we cannot directly measure the extent
of labor productivity risk due to weather risk.33 We must therefore rule out
that the variable bj(i),T proxies for the extent to which weather risk causes
labor productivity risk. This is a possibility because the variable bj(i),T may
32 For example, many ski hotels feature wellness areas that their guests use when they are
not out skiing. It seems safe to assume that hotels would not add a wellness area during
the skiing season since the off-season is a better time for the requisite construction work.
33 The regression (1) will be estimated based on a linked employer-employee dataset that
contains no firm-level balance sheet data.
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be correlated with omitted variables affecting firms’ exposure to weather risk,
Xi,T .34
We address the second identification problem with respect to regressions in
which the variable bj(i),T measures local banks’ equity capital buffers. Our ap-
proach is based on an institutional feature of the Austrian banking system, i.e.,
that it is a “three-pillar” banking system composed of three groups of banks,
i.e., private banks, savings banks, and cooperative banks. The last two groups
contain many small banks with geographically concentrated branch networks.
These small banks cooperate in group-specific internal capital markets, includ-
ing equity capital markets.35 Variation in the groups’ aggregate equity capital
can therefore be used as an instrument for the regional banks’ equity. For
further details regarding this instrument and our measures of regional banks’
equity, see Section 3.2. Validity of the instrument ensures that we can use
the ratio β1/β0 to measure the effect of bank equity on the semi-elasticity of
employment with respect to exogenous labor productivity risk due to snow
risk.36
3 Institutional background
Our analysis is based on a sample of firms exposed to a particularly quantifiable
and exogenous risk affecting the productivity of their employees, i.e., weather
risk. We now describe the firms’ industry, with a focus on its financing and its
labor market. Moreover, we describe the Austrian banking sector.
34 As discussed above, we treat this exposure as a quasi-fixed variable which does not vary
across weeks t.
35 It is clear that the banks obtain their equity capital on group-specific internal capital
markets because ownership linkages are much more prevalent within than across groups.
During our sample period, all groups had group-specific deposit insurance and access to
external equity capital markets through their lead banks.
36 Suppose that bank equity modulates the effect of labor productivity risk ξi,t(T ) on log
employment: ln(ei,t(T )) = θ0ξi,t(T ) +θ1ξi,t(T )bj(i),T + .... Moreover, suppose that snow risk
causes labor productivity risk: ξi,t(T ) = xiσj(i),t(T ) + νi,t(T ), where xi is firm i’s exposure
to snow risk and νi,t(T ) is an error. By using a measure of bank equity uncorrelated
with this error and xi, we can assume that the ratio θ1/θ0 equals the ratio β1/β0 of the
coefficients in regression (1).
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3.1 The Austrian hotel industry
The Austrian hotel industry consists mostly of small family-owned firms: Do-
erflinger, Doerflinger, Gavac, and Vogl (2013) report that such firms account
for 93% of all firms in the industry. Given that the larger hotels tend to operate
in urban areas, these firms are not contained in our sample because we focus
on hotel businesses in ski resorts and exclude firms in towns with a population
larger than 20,000. As a consequence, the fraction of family-owned businesses
in our sample should be even higher than 93%.37
As family-owned businesses, the firms in our sample typically obtain their
outside financing from local banks. When they borrow from the banks, they
often use real estate as collateral, i.e., their buildings and land. In some cases,
the owners are also personally liable for their firms’ debt.38 If the firms receive
outside equity, it is typically from relatives.39
Our sample includes all hotel businesses operating in Austrian municipalities
connected to one of Austria’s ski resorts.40 The firms are subject to demand
shocks due to weather risk. Töglhofer, Eigner, and Prettenthaler (2011) an-
alyze panel data about 185 Austrian ski resorts and find that an unexpected
change in snow conditions by one standard deviation changes the number of
37 We have no data about the ownership structure of the firms in our sample. Data about
the size of hotels is contained in Statistik Austria (2018). At the end of our sample period
(winter 2006), the average Austrian hotel business had an accommodation capacity of 17.9
beds. This average is higher than the average size of hotels in regions with a strong focus
on ski tourism, e.g., Tyrol (15.7 beds) or Vorarlberg (13.3 beds).
38 A case like this is described in Giroud, Mueller, Stomper, and Westerkamp (2011). This
case concerns a financially distressed hotel.
39 Loans from relatives are also treated as equity investments under Austrian bankruptcy
law.
40 We use the following list of Austrian ski resorts: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Liste_der_Skigebiete_in_ÃŰsterreich.
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tourists’ overnight stays in nearby hotels by 0.6-1.9%.41 Not surprisingly, snow
risk also affects the employment of the firms in our sample. In Figure 1, we
plot an average firm’s employment over the weeks of the skiing season. We
measure employment in terms of person-days, as discussed in Section 4.1. The
solid line shows the average total employment and the dashed line plots the
average employment of temporary employees.42 We plot the variation in these
averages over the weeks of the skiing season, i.e., between week 47 and week
15 of the subsequent year.43 The plot reveals that the hotels’ employment ex-
hibits strong seasonal variation, driven by their hiring and firing of temporary
employees. In our empirical analysis, we will focus on these employees because
their employment is clearly associated with ski tourism.
Figure 2 contrasts the plot in Figure 1 with plots depicting variation in ski
resorts’ snow conditions across the weeks of the skiing season. As discussed in
Section 4.1, we focus on the risk that the snow conditions may be too bad for
skiing since there is not enough snow. We measure this risk based on a dummy
variable indicating “ski weeks”, defined as weeks in which the average snow
level in a ski resort exceeded 15 centimeters for a majority of days. The solid
line plots the probability with which, across all ski resorts and years in our
sample, a given week (e.g., the second week of December) is classified as a ski
week. The dashed line plots the standard deviation of this ski week indicator
during the sample period. It appears that the variation in the snow conditions
41 In unreported regressions with resort and year fixed effects, we find similar effects on
tourists’ overnight stays in the resorts included in our sample. Töglhofer et al. (2011)
measure snow conditions in terms of the number of days in which the snow depth at
a resort’s mean altitude exceeds either 1 centimetre or 30 centimetres. As discussed
in Section 4.1, we use a cut-off of 15 centimetres, following Giroud et al. (2011). Like
Töglhofer et al. (2011), we use data about natural snow levels. During our sample period,
there were hardly any snow cannons in Austrian ski resorts. As a consequence, data about
natural snow levels can be used to measure the snow conditions relevant for skiing.
42 As discussed in Section 4.1, we focus on temporary workers employed by the firms in our
sample during the skiing season.
43 These start and end dates are based on information about ski lifts’ opening and closing
dates. See Section 4.1.
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coincides not only with tourists’ demand for accommodation (Töglhofer et al.
(2011)), but also with the employment variation depicted in Figure 1.
In our analysis, we will focus on the variation in employment during the periods
marked by the two corridors of red lines in Figure 1, i.e., the starting and
ending weeks of the skiing season. We thus focus on weeks during which labor
productivity may respond to snow-induced variation in tourists’ demand for
accommodation since the hotels are not booked out.44 We will test whether,
during these weeks, the hotels’ employment depends on the snow conditions in
the nearby ski resorts. These tests will reveal whether the hotels adjust their
employment in response to demand shocks caused by changes in ski resorts’
snow conditions that occur during the skiing season. If the employment is
quasi-fixed, it should not depend on snow “news” realized during the season,
but it may depend on snow risk and the expected snow conditions.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss institutional details concerning the
ski hotels’ risk management with respect to weather-induced demand- and la-
bor productivity risk. With respect to demand risk, the main risk-management
tools are the hotels’ cancellation and pricing policies. While booking platforms
nowadays allow hotels much flexibility in adjusting their prices, these platforms
were not yet common during our sample period.45 This limited the ability of
the hotels to respond to within-season demand shocks by adjusting their prices.
Instead, most hotels set their prices in advance of the skiing season by spec-
ifying two prices per room, i.e., a high-season price and an off-season price.
Given these prices, tourists would typically book their rooms several months in
44 Figure 1 shows that, during the high season, employment is indeed rather constant.
45 For example, consider the most popular platform, i.e., www.booking.com. While this
platform was founded in the Netherlands in 1996, it only started to operate in Austria
in week 27 of 2006, i.e., at the very end of our sample period. Data from Google trends
show zero traffic in Austria before that date. The overall share of total online travel sales
in Europe was only 5.5% in the year 2003 Eurostat (2006).
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advance.46 In the event of a lack of snow, tourists would cancel their bookings
subject to cancellation policies specified in industry-wide terms of trade.47 The
cancellation fee was/is typically a fraction of the total price of a booking, in-
creasing in the lateness of the cancellation. The standard fee schedule specifies
a fee of 70% for cancellations with a notice period of less than 1 month, but the
fee is 90% for cancellations less than one week before the first night booked.48
This fee schedule suggests that tourists’ demand for accommodation during a
given week of the skiing season should depend not only on the current snow
conditions, but also on those lagged by one week because tourists can avoid a
substantial rise in cancellation fees by canceling one week before arrival.
We next turn to the hotels’ contracting with their workers. They typically
employ few permanent workers (mostly members of the owner family) so that
temporary employees constitute most of their workforce during the skiing sea-
son. Under Austrian labor law, these workers (“Saisoniers”) sign fixed-term
contracts with the firms. Such a contract is only valid, if it contains a start
and end date stated as an exact calendar day.49 It is not legal for a firm to
unilaterally fire a temporary worker before the worker’s contract ends. It is,
however, relatively easy for firms and workers to bilaterally extend employ-
ment relationships after the end of employment contracts. As a consequence,
many of the employment contracts specify ending dates before the likely end
of the skiing season. The contracts’ starting dates are instead chosen so that
the workers have sufficient time to move to the ski resort villages before they
46 Even in 2015, 66% of Austrian hotels’ bookings are made more than one month in advance
WKO (2016). In ski resorts, this percentage should be higher because of the missing short-
run bookings by business travelers.
47 The terms of trade are drafted by lawyers of the Austrian Hotel Association. By using
these terms of trade, the hotels avoid costs of legal expertise.
48 This fee schedule has remained unchanged for decades. The 2006 fee schedule is depicted
in the Online Appendix.
49 A contract "starting when the snow arrives and ending when the snow is gone" would be
considered as a permanent contract Steuerberatung (2018).
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have to start working. Hiring workers on the spot is limited by local labor
market tightness since the villages are typically rather small.50
Are there other forms of risk-sharing with workers, e.g. in terms of hours
worked or wage changes? While the workers receive fixed hourly wages, changes
in hours would be possible, in principle. To assess the extent to which snow
risk affects workers’ hours, we can compare the variance of wages that workers
received during the two parts of a skiing season before/after the turn of the
calendar year.51 Given that the season’s starting weeks are in the first part,
snow risk should increase the wage variance during this part of the season if
the risk affects workers’ hours. We however see no evidence for this effect.
In our empirical analysis, we will analyze the extent to which snow risk affects
the employment of the firms in our sample. The firms’ ability to commit to
quasi-fixed labor costs may depend on their access to insurance against weather
risk. Nowadays, the hotels obtain most of this insurance as a consequence of
the extensive use of snow cannons in Austrian ski resorts. The vast majority
of these devices were installed after the end of our sample period.52 During
this period, the hotels also had no other ways of obtaining direct insurance
against weather risk. Markets for suitable weather derivatives do/did not exist
and insurance companies only offer bad-weather-insurance for specific outdoor
events (e.g., ski races) which typically take place during the high-season, rather
than the starting and ending weeks of the skiing season. Given our focus on
these weeks, we can safely assume that the firms in our sample had no options
to obtain explicit insurance against weather risk.
50 For evidence regarding effects of labor market tightness, see Section 6.2.
51 This is possible because we have data about workers’ total annual income (but no more
granular data).
52 The rapid growth in the use of snow cannons after our sample period (1978-2006) can be
illustrated using the following numbers: In 2007, there were 3100 snow cannons in all of
Europe, while in 2015 slightly more of these devices were used in just three Austrian ski
resorts. See https://www.sn.at/wiki/Beschneiungsanlage. Unfortunately, we do not
know any comprehensive historic data about snow cannons installed in Austria.
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3.2 The Austrian banking industry
Like Germany, Austria has a “three-pillar” banking sector, consisting of pri-
vate banks (stock corporations), savings banks, and cooperative banks. The
groups of savings banks and cooperative banks operate within group-specific
institutional frameworks, featuring joint supervisory institutions and deposit
insurance, as well as lead banks that provide the groups with access to the
wider financial markets. Within-group competition between banks is quite
limited, but there is a healthy level of between-group competition. In terms of
population size per bank branch, Austria remains among the most competitive
countries in the European Union.53 In terms of total assets, the savings banks
have a market share of about 20% while the cooperative banks have a share
of about 30% (Bülbül, Schmidt, and Schüwer (2014)).
In terms of ownership links, the groups of savings and cooperative banks are
separate parts of the Austrian banking sector, but there are complex cross-
ownership structures within the groups. The groups feature internal equity
capital markets. For example, the savings banks’ lead bank, Erste Bank, is
partly owned by other savings banks. The internal equity markets are also key
to resolving cases of financial distress. Distressed banks are typically saved
through mergers with other banks in the same group.
As in Germany, the banks within a group also assist each other in their lending,
e.g., by making joint loans.54 This practice complements the groups’ internal
equity markets. To avoid that a lack of equity capital constrains an individual
bank’s lending, the bank can either obtain equity capital from other banks in
the same group or make a joint loan together with the other banks. In the
latter case, the banks’ joint equity capital must be sufficient in order to meet
regulatory equity capital requirements. Throughout our sample period, the
53 See Table 9.2 in ECB (2017).
54 For further discussion with respect to German savings banks, see DSGV (2012).
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Austrian banks were subject to equity capital requirements according to Basel
I.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data
We construct a data set in which one observation corresponds to a firm-week.
The focus is on calendar weeks of the skiing season. In each season T , the
starting weeks are the four weeks 47-50 of the calendar year in which the
season starts. These weeks lead up to the start of the high season, i.e., the
Christmas holidays. The skiing season’s ending weeks are defined as the four
weeks 11-15 of the following calendar year.
Employment data The employment data come from the Austrian Social
Security Database (ASSD). We start with the universe of employment relations
(spells) in the Austrian tourism sector between 1977 and 2011: 10,316,391
employment spells between 1,603,556 distinct employees and 136,735 firms.
47.5% of these spells concern employees working in ski tourism. To identify
these employment spells, we use the above-stated definition of the skiing season
and only consider spells in municipalities featuring at least one ski lift within
a radius of 10 km, excluding cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants. Within
this group, most of the workers are in the hotel industry (62.9%), while the
rest work in other accommodation, or in food and beverage services.55
Given that we have no data about hours worked, we focus on the days during
which an employee was employed by a firm. The sample of firms includes all
employers that appear in the employment spells associated with ski tourism,
55 For simplicity, we will refer to all of these workers as workers employed by hotels. This
makes sense because most hotels feature restaurants and bars that operate in much the
same way as other restaurants and bars in ski resorts.
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as defined above. To measure a firm’s number of employment, we first define
a dummy variable, denoted as Ew,i,d, which indicates whether worker w was
employed at firm i on calendar day d. We next use this dummy to measure







where t indexes weeks, T indexes skiing seasons, and D(t, T ) is the set of
calendar days in a particular week. We construct two versions of the above-
stated variable for each of the tourism businesses in the ski resorts. The
first variable measures firm i’s total employment days based on all of our
data about employment spells involving this firm. The second variable is the
dependent variable of our regressions. It measures employment days based on
the employment spells associated with ski tourism, as defined above. Figure 1
plots averages of these two variables across all firms and skiing seasons.
We also construct a variable measuring the level of labor market tightness
(LMT) within firm i’s county c(i) in year T . LMT is defined as the inverse of
the county’s unemployment rate, i.e. (1 − unemployment ratec(i),t).
Snow data We use the same snow data as Töglhofer et al. (2011). The data
come from the Austrian Meteorological Office (AMO). The AMO provided us
with 1 × 1 km grid data containing daily information on snow depth, based on
a snow cover model using air temperature and precipitation data (Beck, Hiebl,
Koch, Potzmann, and Schöner (2009)) as inputs. The model has been used
to generate natural snow data for the years 1973-2006. The data can be used
to measure the snow conditions relevant for skiing because, before 2006, there
were few snow cannons in Austrian ski resorts.52
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We match the snow data to municipalities based on the coordinates of all ski
lifts within a 10 kilometer radius around the geographic center of a munici-
pality’s area. This radius defines the ski resort j(i) around a firm i, based on
the municipality key of the firm. To determine the snow conditions in this ski
resort, we consider the center of each ski lift in the resort and average the snow
levels at the closest grid points using our gridded snow data. Given a resort’s
average snow levels for each day of our sample period, we define a snow-week
dummy that equals one during weeks in which the average snow level exceeded
15cm on a majority of days.56
Figure 3 illustrates our mapping of ski lifts to municipalities for the municipal-
ity of Lech am Arlberg, a well known resort in the Austrian state of Vorarlberg.
The dashed circle is at a radius of 10 kilometers around the center of Lech. To
measure the snow conditions around Lech, we consider all ski lifts marked by
red lines. The grid of points shows the locations for which we have snow data.
For each ski lift, we use the data for the grid point closest to the center of the
line representing the ski lift.
In our empirical analysis, we will distinguish between two types of information
about the snow conditions in ski resorts, i.e., information available before the
start of the skiing season, and “news” that arrive during the season. The first
type of information includes the expected snow conditions in ski resorts, and
a measure of snow risk. As discussed above, we focus on whether the snow
conditions allowed for skiing, using our snow dummy to indicate a sufficient
level of snow. To measure the expected snow conditions during week t in
season T , we compute the average of the snow-week dummy during the same
week of the previous five years. Snow risk is defined in a similar way, based on
the standard deviation of the snow-week dummy. The formal definitions are
56 In choosing the 15cm cutoff, we follow Giroud et al. (2011).
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as follows:











(Snow weekj,t,T −n − Average snowj,t,T )2, (4)
where j indexes ski resorts. The sums are based on five year’s of data prior
to a skiing season T , i.e., the data about a week t of the five previous skiing
seasons. The above-stated definitions thus allow for variation over time in our
measures of expected snow and snow risk. In fact, climate change is likely to
affect the first and second moments of the distribution of snow fall. Below,
we document that the snow variables defined above indeed exhibit significant
long-term trends.
We also use a measure of snow “news”, defined as the difference between the
snow-week dummy and expected snow:
Snow newsj,t,T = Snow weekj,t,T − Expected snowj,t,T . (5)
Banking data Balance sheet data about Austrian banks are available from
the Austrian Central Bank (OeNB). The data start in the year 1998 and con-
tain unconsolidated balance sheets of all banks operating in Austria. To map
the data to the firms in our sample, we use data about the branch networks
of Austrian banks. This second type of data also comes from the OeNB.
The mapping is again based on the municipality keys of the firms in our sample.
We first assign to each firm i the coordinates of the center of the area associated
with the firm’s municipality. Then, we identify all bank branches within a
radius of 20 kilometers around these coordinates. This defines the banking
landscape around firm i. Given this area, we can define a number of variables.












where the fraction is the equity ratio of bank b in year T , and we compute a
weighted average of the equity ratios of all banks. For bank b, the weight is
the number of its branches in the area of firm i divided by the total number
of bank branches in this area, mi,b,T /Mi,T .
As discussed in Section 2, we use specific measures of the equity capital of the
groups of savings banks (Sparkassen) and cooperative banks (Volksbanken and
Raiffeisenbanken). We refer to these banks as “regional banks” and denote the











where M regi,T denotes the number of regional banks in the area of hotel i.
The above-stated measures of bank equity result from bank-level balance sheet
data. In addition, we measure bank equity at the level of banking groups. The
resulting measure of bank equity will be used as an instrument for the regional










where Total equitygrpb,T denotes the aggregate equity capital of the group of
banks associated with bank b (i.e., the sum of the equity capital of all member
banks of this group), and Total assetsgrpb,T denotes the group’s aggregate assets.
While the last two measures of bank equity are only available for the regional
banks, we also define a variable which combines the group-level equity ratios
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with the equity ratios of banks that are not part of a group. This variable is
denoted as Bank Equitygrpi,T . It is defined in a similar way as the variable in
expression (6), but we replace the equity ratios of all regional banks in firm i’s
area by the group-level equity ratios of these banks’ groups.
Besides equity ratios, we use two other variables describing the local bank-
ing landscape around firm i: The number of banks in the vicinity and a
measure of the extent to which the banks operate on a nationwide scale,
Branch diversification. The number of banks is simply defined as the number
of distinct banking groups which operate in the 20 kilometer radius around
the center of a postal code area. A bank’s Branch diversification is defined as
the euclidean distance of all branches to a hypothetical mid-branch. To com-










(latn,b,T − latb,T )2 + (lonn,b,T − lonb,T )2
(9)
where n indexes the branches of bank b. The hypothetical mid-branch location
is given by latb,T and lonb,T which are defined as the average latitude and
longitude of all of bank b’s branches in year T .
Following Berger and Bouwman (2009), we also construct a variable charac-
terizing the liquidity creation capacity of banks operating in the 20 kilometer







2(Illiquid assetsb,T + Liquid liabilitiesb,T ) (10)




We next discuss the descriptive statistics of our main variables. Table 1 con-
cerns our snow variables, i.e., our dummy variables indicating snow days and
snow weeks, as well as the variables measuring expected snow and snow risk,
as defined in expressions (4). While the dummy variables are based on the
entire period for which we have snow data (1978-2006), the latter variables are
measured over the period 1983-2007 (because each data point of these vari-
ables is based on the past 5 years of snow data). For each variable, we report
the extent of its variation between and within ski resort-years. The within-
variation in snow risk is key to our research strategy for measuring effects of
exogenous labour productivity risk on firm-level employment. The descriptive
statistics show that the within-variation accounts for a substantial part of the
overall variation in snow risk and expected snow.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics regarding our measures of firm-level em-
ployment in employment days of all employees and ski employees. Employment
days are defined in expression (2). We separately report summary statistics
for the entire winter season, the starting weeks and the ending weeks of the
winter season. These statistics complement Figure 1 which shows the variation
in employment days over the weeks of the skiing season. Both in terms of num-
ber of employees and employment days, temporary employment accounts for
roughly 50% of total employment of the firms in our sample. In our analysis,
we do analyse the extensive margin of running the firm in certain weeks, which
explains the existence of zero employees in certain weeks of the season.57
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics about variables which do not vary within
the winter season, i.e. variables which characterize the local banking landscape
and altitude. The average firm is located at around 1000 meters above sea
57 However, the firm must be open, i.e. employ workers, for at least a week during the winter
season in order to be included in our sample.
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level. Concerning the local banking landscape, on average there are about 6
distinct banks located in the vicinity of our firms. The mean of equity ratio
of these banks is roughly the same at 8% for (i) the universe of banks and
the subset of regional banks, and (ii) bank-level balance sheet data and group-
level consolidated balance sheet data. Not surprisingly, the standard deviation
of group-level consolidated equity ratios is relatively lower when compared to
unconsolidated equity ratios. On average, the banks around our firms span
a branch network of 2000 kilometers, with some banks being very local while
other banks operating nationwide.
5 Main results
5.1 Weather risk and employment
As discussed above, our research question concerns firms’ risk-taking when
they employ workers whose productivity depends on the weather. Given this
focus, we start our analysis by testing whether the firms in our sample share
risk with their workers by adjusting their employment in response to weather
realizations. As hotels in ski resorts, they could be responding to changes in the
resorts’ snow conditions that affect tourists’ demand for accommodation during
a skiing season. In addition, their employment could depend on information
about snow conditions that the firms obtained before the start of the season.
The latter information may change the firms’ pre-season expectations about
the expected snow conditions as well as snow risk. For example, the firms
could use this information in order to update their expectations with respect
to effects of climate change. The specifications of our snow variables allow
for this updating of expectations because we they are based on 5-year rolling
windows of data.
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We start by documenting that our snow variables are indeed subject to sig-
nificant long-term trends because the snow conditions in Austrian ski resorts
have been changing over time. Table 2 presents regressions of our snow vari-
ables (defined in expression (4)) on calendar years and ski resort-week fixed
effects. The fixed effects pick up differences between ski resorts in the typical
extent and timing of snowfall. Given our interest in long-term trends, we use
all available snow data, including years for which we have no employment or
bank data. The data cover the period 1983-2007.58
We find that mean snow decreased over time, while snow risk increased. While
the strength of the former trend decreases in the altitude of ski resorts, that
of the latter trend increases in altitude. We measure altitude both in terms of
standard deviations (across ski resorts) and in terms of a dummy indicating
ski resorts at above-median altitude. In addition, we distinguish between the
starting and ending weeks of the skiing season, as well as the rest of the season
(as an omitted category). With respect to the starting (ending) weeks, we
see weaker (stronger) negative time trends in mean snow. Snow risk increased
particularly strongly during both the starting and ending weeks, and even more
so at higher levels of altitude.
All in all, the estimates suggest the existence of long-term trends worsening the
snow conditions in Austrian ski resorts. Ski resorts at higher levels of altitude
were subject to particularly strong increases in snow risk. At above-median
altitudes, snow risk increased on average (across all weeks) by 8.6% over the
25 years 1983-2007. This number implies an increase in snow risk of more
than 40% relative to its 1982 mean in the higher 50% of ski resorts, which was
20.7% (across all weeks).
58 While our snow data start in 1978, we need the first five years of data to compute the value
of the dependent variables of our regressions in the year 1983. We cluster the standard
errors at the level of ski resorts to address the problem that consecutive years’ observations
of our dependent variables are based on overlapping snow data.
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We next analyze how the changing snow conditions in Austrian ski resorts
affect firm-level employment. As discussed above, the firms in our sample face
exogenous labor productivity risk since the snow conditions affect tourists’
demand for accommodation and related services. We test whether the firms
manage this risk by adjusting their employment when the snow conditions
change during the season. If/once there is ample snow for skiing, the firms
can safely assume that skiing will remain possible for some time. During the
starting weeks of the skiing season, it is, however, typically hard to predict the
snow conditions more than a few days ahead since reliable weather forecasts
are only available over short horizons. In this situation, many firms take
labor productivity risk when they commit to employing workers, promising
them pay before they generate uncertain revenues.59 It is this risk-taking that
we are particularly interested in, but we start our analysis by testing more
comprehensively whether the firms respond to variation in snow conditions
observed before and during a skiing season.
Table 5 reports regressions explaining firm-level employment of workers in ski
tourism using our measures of expected snow, snow risk, and snow “news”, i.e.,
the difference between the snow-week dummy in a given week and its mean over
the last five years. The dependent variable is employee days EDi,t,T , defined
in expression (2) above. We use this variable to measure firms’ employment
based on the employment spells that fall into the skiing season. Its mean
variation across the skiing weeks is depicted by the dashed line in Figure
2. Our regressions test formally for effects of the snow variables defined in
expressions (4) and (5) while allowing for fixed effects at the firm-year and
week levels. The firm-year fixed effects control for determinants of firm-level
59 As discussed in Section 3, the firms need to allow many of their workers some time to
move before they can start working. As a consequence, they have to hire the workers
well before the start of the skiing season. This is possible because the firms can trust
that a potential late start of the skiing season is a temporary negative shock to labor
productivity, rather than a persistent shock. See Guiso et al. (2005) for evidence that
firms insure their workers against temporary productivity shocks.
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employment that remain constant across the weeks of a given skiing season.
This includes effects of firms’ permanent employment, their facilities (e.g., spas
which entertain tourists when there is not enough snow for skiing), and capital
structures, but also effects of ski resort infrastructure, location, etc. The week
fixed effects control for trends affecting all ski resorts, e.g., general demand
fluctuations due to official holidays in Austria and neighboring countries.60
As discussed above, we focus on the starting and ending weeks of the skiing
season, i.e., the weeks in which the snow conditions determine demand in ski
resorts since the hotels in the resorts are not booked out. We actually distin-
guish between the two sets of weeks because negative snow shocks are likely
to be temporary shocks during the starting weeks, but these shocks are likely
to be permanent during the ending weeks. By running separate regressions for
the two types of weeks, we also allow for different fixed effects. The estimates
appear in the two panels of Table 5, with standard errors clustered at the
ski-resort level.
All estimates show that firms’ employment during the skiing season responds
significantly positively to expected snow. With respect to snow risk, we find a
significantly negative effect, but only during the starting weeks. The opposite
picture emerges with respect to snow news. It appears that the firms respond
to snow news by adjusting their employment, but only during the ending weeks
of the skiing season. The lack of similar evidence with respect to the starting
weeks is consistent with the idea that, during these weeks, snow shocks are
temporary shocks to labor productivity, and that firms insure their workers
against these shocks.61 This idea goes back to Knight (1971) and corroborating
60 For example, schools in Vienna are always closed during the first week of February so that
families can go skiing for one week.
61 This is true for both negative and positive shocks because both types of shocks cause only
temporary changes in labor productivity before the hotels are booked out after Christmas
(– the start of the high season).
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evidence appears in the literature following Guiso et al. (2005). Our results
confirm the findings of this literature based on a novel identification strategy.
More importantly, we add evidence regarding effects of risk. In this respect,
our analysis yields novel evidence because we identify effects of risk conditional
on the effects of “news”. This conditioning is key if we are to interpret our
results as evidence regarding models in which firms commit to quasi-fixed labor
costs when they hire employees. In fact, our evidence shows that snow risk
affects employment during the weeks in which snow news do not. In our main
analysis, we will refine our analysis in order to obtain estimates that can be
explicitly interpreted as evidence regarding labor productivity risk. For now,
we can only interpret the estimates with respect to snow risk.
To assess the economic significance of the effect of snow risk, we use the stan-
dard deviation of snow risk within ski resort-years, reported in Table 1. Given
this standard deviation of 20%, the coefficient of snow risk in Table 5 implies
that a one-standard deviation increase in the risk reduces employment in ski
tourism during the skiing season’s starting weeks by about 3%.
Overall, the results in this section suggest that, while we consider a specific
sample of firms exposed to a particularly quantifiable type of exogenous labor
productivity risk, we actually focus on firms that behave like many other firms
in terms of risk-sharing with their workers: It appears that the firms take the
risk of temporary labor productivity shocks, but not that of more persistent
shocks. This suggests that we should also obtain externally valid results when
we analyze the firms’ response to snow risk as a source of labor productivity risk
affecting the firms to a degree determined by their (quasi-fixed) employment.
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5.2 Bank equity and employment
5.2.1 OLS estimates
In this section, we present estimates regarding our main regressions, i.e., the
regressions of the type stated in expression (1). We start by presenting ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimates. Table 6 reports first tests of the hypothesis that
bank equity affects the risk-taking of the firms in our sample with respect to
the risk of temporary labor productivity shocks due to snow risk. For now,
we focus on the starting weeks of the skiing season, i.e., the weeks during
which the firms’ employment appears to be quasi-fixed with respect to snow
news. The regressions extend those in Table 5. They not only include our
snow variables, but also their interactions with measures of the equity ratios
of banks in the vicinity of the firms in our sample. We measure these equity
ratios in terms of basis points because they are generally quite small, typically
taking values between 5 and 10%.
The main coefficient of interest is that of the interaction of bank equity and
snow risk. Our OLS estimates of this coefficient are first evidence regarding
the effect of bank equity as a variable modulating the negative effect of snow
risk on employment.62 All estimates suggest that firms in areas with more
bank equity take more risk by employing more workers. While employment
decreases in snow risk, the coefficient of the interaction of snow risk and bank
equity is significantly positive. We also find that employment is lower in resorts
with less expected snow, and that this correlation appears to be weaker in areas
where banks have more equity capital. Below, we however find that, this last
effect is not robust. In our instrumental variables (IV) regressions, only the
coefficient of the interaction of bank equity and snow risk remains statistically
62 Alternatively, bank equity may simply proxy for the extent to which snow risk causes labor
productivity risk. We address this issue by means of instrumental variables estimates. See
Section 5.2.2.
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significant. These regressions will allow us to more specifically interpret our
estimates as causal evidence that bank equity affects firms’ risk-taking with
respect to exogenous labor productivity risk.
The evidence in Table 6 is robust with respect to changing our measures of
bank equity in a number of ways. We start by measuring bank equity at the
bank-level based on data about all banks, i.e., we use the variable defined in
expression (6). Next, we only consider regional banks that are part of banking
groups, using the measure of bank equity in expression (7). Both specifications
result in rather similar estimates. Slightly larger estimates result from measur-
ing bank equity at the level of banking groups, rather than at the bank-level.
These estimates appear in the second part of Table 6. They are based on
data about the many regional Austrian banks that are part of banking groups,
cooperating in their lending activities and sharing internal equity capital mar-
kets, i.e., the savings banks and cooperative banks. By measuring bank equity
at the group-level, we obtain measures that are exogenous because the groups
operate throughout Austria, so that their business in any particular ski resort
will only have a negligible effect on their aggregate equity capital.
The next-to-last column of Table 6 presents estimates in which we measure
bank equity at the group-level for all banks that actually belong to banking
groups. For the other banks, we continue to measure their equity capital at the
bank level, at the risk that the resulting estimates are subject to endogeneity
biases.63 To avoid this risk, we also present estimates that result from only
using the group-level measures of bank equity. These estimates appear in the
last column of Table 6. They result from only using data about regional banks
which are part of banking groups and measuring bank equity according to ex-
pression (8). The resulting measure will be used below in IV regressions, and
the OLS estimates in the last column of Table 6 can be seen as the correspond-
63 For further discussion, see the following section.
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ing reduced-form estimates. We no longer observe a significant effect of the
interaction of bank equity and expected snow, but again find that bank equity
alleviates the negative effect of snow risk on employment. It thus appears that
bank equity acts as a catalyst for the risk taking firms engage in when they
commit to quasi-fixed employment. If we interpret the estimates of our OLS
regressions in a causal way, they suggest that an additional basis point of bank
equity reduces the negative effect of snow risk on employment by about 1%,
i.e., the ratio of the coefficient of the interaction of snow risk and bank equity
and the baseline coefficient of snow risk.64 Estimates of this ratio appear in
the bottom of Table 6.
We next test whether similar results can also be obtained based on the data
about the ending weeks of the skiing season. During these weeks, the firms’
employment does not appear to be quasi-fixed: The estimates in Table 5 show
that the firms respond to snow “news” by adjusting their employment, and
that we cannot find the significantly negative effect of snow risk on employment
observed during the skiing season’s starting weeks. These results suggest that,
during the season’s ending weeks, the firms’ are not committing to a quasi-
fixed level of employment associated with ski tourism. Instead, their workers
appear to bear labor productivity risk associated with snow risk. If the firms
are indeed not taking this risk, then they avoid the risk of liquidity shocks
which would otherwise be caused by employees not being able to “earn their
pay”. As a consequence, the firms’ employment should not depend on bank
equity as a proxy for banks’ ability to provide liquidity insurance to the firms.
Table 7 shows the results of a placebo test in which we use our data about
the ending weeks of the skiing season in order to replicate the analysis behind
the results reported in Table 6. Confirming the results in Table 5, we again
find no significant main effect of snow risk on employment associated with
64 In expression (1), this ratio is denoted as β1/β0.
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ski tourism. The coefficients of snow risk are also much smaller than those in
Table 6. The same is true for the coefficients of the interaction of snow risk and
bank equity. In fact, only one of these coefficients has a statistically significant
estimate. This estimate results from our bank-level measure of bank equity
and may therefore be biased by endogeneity of bank equity.65 If we instead
use our group-level measures of bank equity, we find no statistically significant
evidence that bank equity modulates the effect of snow risk on employment
during the ending weeks of the skiing season. All in all, the placebo test is
rather consistent with the idea that, during the season’s ending weeks, snow
risk induces a labor productivity risk (mostly) borne by workers in ski tourism.
Overall, our analysis so far highlights that the effect of risk on employment
depends both on the extent to which employment is quasi-fixed, and on bank
equity. The first effect shows that analyses measuring effects of risk on em-
ployment need to be based on prior tests regarding the risk-sharing between
firms and their employees. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first
to employ this research strategy. In the remainder of the paper, we will focus
on the second result, i.e., the effect of bank equity.
5.2.2 IV estimates
In this section, we address the issue that we cannot directly observe the extent
to which snow risk causes labor productivity risk in our sample of firms. In
interpreting our previous estimates as evidence that bank equity affects firms’
risk-taking with respect to labor productivity risk, we implicitly assume that
it does not affect the extent to which this risk is caused by snow risk. This
assumption cannot be tested without direct data about labor productivity.
65 In our IV regressions, we in fact find direct evidence that bank equity is endogenous
if measured at the bank level. The endogeneity problem notwithstanding, a positive
coefficient of the interaction of snow risk and bank equity could also indicate that the
ending and starting weeks of the skiing season are not that different in terms of the effect
of snow risk on employment associated with ski tourism. Some of this employment may
also be quasi-fixed during the season’s ending weeks.
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We can, however, rule out that we use variation in bank equity which may
be correlated with variation across firms or ski resorts in the extent to which
snow risk causes labor productivity risk. This allows us to measure the effect
of bank equity on the extent to which labor productivity risk reduces firms’
quasi-fixed employment.
This causal effect of bank equity is measured in Table 8 which presents our IV
estimates. As discussed in Section 2, these estimates are based on institutional
features of the Austrian banking sector, i.e. that many regional Austrian banks
are part of banking groups, cooperating in their lending activities and sharing
internal equity capital markets. We instrument the equity capital ratios of
individual regional member banks of the various banking groups using the
aggregate equity capital ratio of a bank’s group. The instrument is defined in
expression (8). To use this instrument, we must, however, focus on effects of
the equity capital buffers of banks that are actually part of a banking group,
i.e., the savings banks and cooperative banks.66 The reduced form estimates
appear in the last column of Table 6.
The IV estimates appear in the right-most column of Table 8. The two preced-
ing columns present two first stage regressions, regarding the interactions of
bank equity with expected snow and snow risk. The first column of estimates
in Table 8 repeats the OLS estimates (which also appeared in the second col-
umn of estimates in Table 6). Throughout, we use the same large set of fixed
effects as in Table 6 and again report clustered standard errors (at the village
level). The fixed effects control for the effect of bank equity per se.
In the first-stage regressions, we obtain satisfactory results of the F-tests for
the excluded instrument. Comparing the OLS and IV estimates shows that
the puzzling negative coefficient of the interaction of expected snow and bank
equity becomes statistically insignificant when we instrument this interaction
66 There are two types of cooperative banks, i.e., the Volksbanken and the Raiffeisenbanken.
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term. The coefficient’s point estimate is closer to zero, with a wider confi-
dence interval relative to the corresponding OLS estimates. We also obtain a
substantially wider confidence interval for the coefficient of the interaction of
snow risk and bank equity, but the IV point estimate of this coefficient is more
negative than the OLS point estimate. As a consequence, this coefficient re-
mains statistically significant. To assess the economic significance of the effect
of bank equity, we again compare the coefficient of its interaction with snow
risk to the coefficient of snow risk per se. The ratio of the two coefficients
is denoted as β1/β0 in expression (1). In terms of this ratio, reported in the
bottom of Table 8, the IV results are rather similar to the OLS results.
All in all, our estimates reveal that banks’ equity capital buffers affect the risk-
taking of firms in the banks’ vicinity when they commit to employing workers
on a quasi-fixed basis. The IV estimates allow for a more specific interpretation
of the results as evidence concerning firms’ risk-taking with respect to labor
productivity risk induced by weather risk. They show that bank equity does
not just proxy for variation across firms in the extent to which snow risk causes
labor productivity risk. While this may be true, the IV estimates show that
the effect of the latter risk on firms’ employment depends on bank equity.
6 Further results
In this section, we extend our analysis to take into account further character-
istics of local banking and labor markets. We test for cross-sectional variation
in the effect of bank equity on the risk-taking of firms when they commit to
quasi-fixed employment. If this effect exists because firms rely on banks as
providers of liquidity insurance, then we should see stronger effects in mar-
kets where a lack of bank equity more strongly constrains the availability of
this liquidity insurance because other constraints are less binding. Moreover,
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we should see stronger effects in labor markets where firms find it harder to
respond to labor productivity shocks by adjusting their employment.
6.1 Variation across regional banking markets
In this section, we contrast regional banking markets that differ in terms of
the number of banks, the banks’ geographic diversification, and their liquidity.
We hypothesize that, in markets with more banks or more diversified/more
liquid banks, firms’ access to bank-provided liquidity insurance depends more
strongly on bank equity.
We test this hypothesis by extending our previous regressions in order to in-
clude triple interactions of snow risk, bank equity, and one of the three other
variables mentioned above. Moreover, we check the robustness of the effect of
bank equity in horse-race specifications in which we include the other variables
in the same way in which bank equity appears in the regressions. The tests
will appear in regressions based on our data about the starting weeks of the
skiing season, i.e., the weeks during which the employment of the firms in our
sample can be regarded as quasi-fixed.
Tables 9 - 11 report the results. In each table, the first column of estimates
repeats the results of a previously reported regression based on the measure of
bank equity that results from measuring bank equity at the level of banking
groups except for banks that do not belong to a group. The second col-
umn shows regressions in which we just test whether another characteristic of
banking markets affects our firms’ risk-taking when they commit to quasi-fixed
employment. We find that this risk-taking tends to increase in the number of
banks in a region (Table 9), as well as in the extent of the banks’ geographic
diversification (Table 10). These results appear to be robust, as illustrated by
the estimates based on the horse-race specifications reported in the third col-
umn of estimates in each table. The estimates also confirm the robustness of
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the effect of bank equity. In all tables, we observe similar coefficients of the in-
teraction of snow risk and bank equity in the first column (baseline estimates)
and the third column (horse-race estimates).
With respect to banks’ liquidity creation capacity (LCC), we find no significant
coefficient of its interaction with snow risk, but we can also confirm that the
effect of bank equity is robust in a horse-race specification, reported in the
third column of estimates in Table 11. Moreover, we observe an interesting
effect of LCC when we include its triple interaction with snow risk and bank
equity. The last column of estimates in Table 11 reports that the coefficient of
the triple interaction is significantly positive. It appears that, in markets with
higher LCC, bank equity more strongly alleviates the negative effect of snow
risk on employment. This is consistent with the hypothesis that, in markets
with higher LCC, bank equity more strongly constrains banks’ provision of
liquidity insurance to the firms in our sample, and, thus, the firms’ capacity
to take the risk of liquidity shortfalls due to labor productivity shocks.
Similar hypotheses explain the results we obtain when we use triple interaction
terms based on the two other features of banking markets, i.e., the number of
banks and banks’ geographic diversification. The coefficients of these variables
interactions with snow risk and bank equity are reported in the last column
of estimates in Tables 9 and 10. Both coefficients are significantly positive,
consistent with the hypothesis that, in markets with more or more diversi-
fied banks, bank equity more strongly constrains banks’ provision of liquidity
insurance to the firms in our sample because other constraints are less bind-
ing. This is also consistent with our previous findings that snow risk has a
smaller negative effect on the employment of firms in markets with more or
more diversified banks.
In summary, the results in Tables 9 - 11 are all consistent with our interpre-
tation of the effect of bank equity on the way firms’ quasi-fixed employment
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responds to snow risk as a source of labor productivity risk in our sample. The
results suggest that bank equity affects firms’ access to bank-provided liquidity
insurance when they take the risk of liquidity shocks induced by labor produc-
tivity shocks. We find that a lack of bank equity more strongly constrains the
availability of this liquidity insurance in markets in which other constraints
are less binding because there are more or more diversified/more liquid banks.
6.2 Labor market tightness
Our results relate to employment being quasi-fixed at the beginning of the
season. This is due to the hotel’s need to fix the manpower before the first
guest arrives at the start of the season and the impossibility to intermittently
reduce and refill this manpower at will. As all hotels in the Alps start their
skiing season around the same time, getting rid of dispensable workers in
case of unexpectedly bad snow conditions is too risky for the hotel, because
the employees – around 30 % of them foreign nationals – might be poached
by other hotels. This should be even more so, the more tight local labor
markets are. Notwithstanding the high share of foreign workers, local labour
market tightness should increase the amount of quasi-fixed-ness of early-season
employment.
In Table 12 we split our sample into two subgroups according to the labor
market tightness of the county in which the firm operates. The labor market
tightness is defined as (1−unemployment ratec(i),T ) in county c(i) and year T .
We present results for the early season only. The average unemployment rate
in the high LMT regions is 6.7%, but 12.8% in the low LMT region, which is
a quite substantial variation.
Here, we see that in regions with high labor market tightness, hotel’s employ-
ment reacts more negatively to ex-ante snow risk as hotels in regions with
lower labor market tightness do. Moreover, this negative reaction to snow risk
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in high LMT regions is exacerbated if the local banks lack equity capital. This
is consistent with the idea that bank equity affects firms’ capacity to commit
to quasi-fixed employment because employment should be more quasi-fixed in
areas with tighter labor markets.
In contrast to all previous results, we see in the case of hotels in regions with
low labor market tightness that firms do adapt their employment in the case
of positive snow news – even in the early season. Low labor market tightness
does not make insuring workers for temporary shocks necessary for the hotel:
workers can be found in the market. These results suggest that our evidence is
generally relevant for firms in industries and regions with tight labor markets.
7 Conclusion
We analyze the effect of risk on small-firm employment. The analysis is based
on highly granular data about a sample of small firms exposed to weather
risk as a particularly quantifiable risk affecting the productivity of the firms’
employees. We find that the firms’ employment is quasi-fixed with respect
to snow risk as a cause of transitory shocks to labor productivity, but not
with respect to more permanent shocks during the ending weeks of the skiing
season. While the transitory shocks during the season’s starting weeks have
no direct effects, the firms’ employment varies in the snow risk driving these
shocks. We thus provide evidence that labor productivity risk affects quasi-
fixed employment. The evidence is consistent with central assumptions in the
macroeconomic models of Quadrini (2017) and Arellano et al. (2019). To the
best of our knowledge, prior analyses of the effects of risk on employment were
not explicitly focused on the quasi-fixed form of employment which appears in
the models.
We also measure the effect of bank equity on the risk-taking that firms engage
in when they employ workers on a quasi-fixed basis even though the produc-
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tivity of the workers is subject to transitory shocks. Instrumental variables
estimates show that firms take more labor productivity risk if the banks in the
firms’ vicinity hold more equity capital. To assess the economic significance
of this effect, we measure its size relative to the baseline effect of snow risk on
firms’ (quasi-fixed) employment. It thus turns out that our analysis identifies
a real effect of bank equity which is not only statistically but also economically
significant. We thus add to the literature on employment effects of changes in
risk that occur against the backdrop of financial market imperfections.
Our analysis is motivated by the idea that firms need insurance against liq-
uidity shocks in order to provide workers with stable employment and pay
even though they generate uncertain revenues. The empirical findings of this
paper suggest that small firms depend on liquidity insurance provided by local
banks. If these banks lack equity capital, the firms’ employment responds more
strongly to changes in the risk of liquidity shocks hitting the firms when their
workers are temporarily unable to “earn their pay”. This is consistent with
the idea that bank liquidity creation gets impaired when banks lack equity
capital.67 It seems that the firms in our sample cannot easily switch to other
ways of obtaining liquidity, e.g., by means of positions in weather derivatives.
In this respect, they may be similar to other small firms. As a risk of rather
verifiable shocks, weather risk should be particularly suited for risk-sharing be-
tween small firms and their banks. By offering this risk-sharing to many small
firms in their vicinity, banks should be able to realize economies of scale that
would remain unrealized if the firms sought to individually insure themselves
against weather risk.
The results of our analysis highlight that bank equity capital regulation is rel-
evant for economic adaptation to climate change. We argue that bank equity
affects banks’ performance as risk-sharing partners of firms in the real econ-
67 See Berger and Bouwman (2009) for a review of the literature regarding bank liquidity
creation.
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omy. While we stress risk-sharing with respect to the risk of weather-induced
liquidity shocks, weather risk should also cause other financial risks. We think
that it will be key to understand the real effects of these risks, and we hope
that this paper motivates further research by documenting an important real
effect of bank equity.
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This figure plots an average firm’s total employment (solid line) and employ-
ment in ski tourism (dashed line). We measure employment in terms of person-
days. We plot the variation in these averages over the weeks of the skiing
season, i.e., between week 47 and week 15 of the subsequent year. The vertical
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Table 1: Summary statistics: Snow conditions
This table reports summary statistics regarding the snow conditions in Austrian ski resorts
during the years 1998-2006. We split the variation in the snow variables into variation
between and within resort-years. The within component measures variation across the weeks
of a winter season in a given ski resort. Snow days are defined as the number of days in
a week for which the ski resort’s average snow coverage exceeds 15 centimeters. Weeks in
which the majority of days are snow days are considered snow weeks. Expected snow (Snow
risk) is defined as the backward-looking 5 year average (standard deviation) of snow week
in a given resort and week.
Variable Category Mean SD Min Max Obs
Winter season
Snow days overall 4.189 3.257 0 7 77490
between 2.192 3690
within 2.41 21
Snow week overall .594 .491 0 1 77490
between .317 3690
within .375 21
Average snow overall .556 .338 0 1 77490
between .249 3690
within .229 21




Snow days overall 2.168 2.967 0 7 14760
between 2.56 3690
within 1.5 4
Snow week overall .3 .458 0 1 14760
between .382 3690
within .254 4
Average snow overall .288 .263 0 1 14760
between .217 3690
within .149 4




Snow days overall 3.795 3.297 0 7 18450
between 2.82 3690
within 1.708 5
Snow week overall .541 .498 0 1 18450
between .412 3690
within .28 5
Average snow overall .5 .34 0 1 18450
between .31 3690
within .139 5





This figure plots variation in snow conditions during the skiing season. The
solid line depicts the average of the snow week dummy over all ski resorts
and all years. The dashed line plots the standard deviation of this ski week
indicator during the sample period. The vertical red lines indicate the starting
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Fi g u r e 3
T his fi g ur e ill ustr at es t h e m at c hi n g of s n o w d at a t o fir ms, gi v e n t h e fir ms’
m u ni ci p alit y k e ys. We first c oll e ct t h e c o or di n at es of all s ki lifts wit hi n a
r a di us of 1 0 k m f or e a c h m u ni ci p alit y’s c e nt er. N e xt, w e d et er mi n e t h e cl os est
d at a gri d p oi nt t o t h e c e nt er of e a c h s ki lift. C o or di n at es of s ki lifts w er e
r etri e v e d fr o m O p e n Str e et M a p, t h e 1 × 1 k m gri d d at a o n s n o w d e pt h w as
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Table 3: Summary statistics: Employment
This table reports summary statistics regarding the employment of firms in Austrian ski
resorts during the years 1998-2006. We split the variation in our measures of employment
into variation between and within firm-years. The within component measures variation
across the weeks of a winter season in a given firm. The number of employees is defined
as the sum of distinct employees of a hotel in a given week. Employment days is defined
as the total number of days these workers are employed during a hotel-week. We report
summary statistics for these variables based on all employees and based on firms’ temporary
employees during the skiing season.
Variable Category Mean SD min max Obs
Winter season
Employment days overall 24.907 57.514 0 2853 1777902
between 55.291 84662
within 15.838 21




Employment days overall 15.426 46.598 0 2256 338648
between 45.585 84662
within 9.665 4




Employment days overall 24.274 56.147 0 2195 423310
between 55.607 84662
within 7.769 5




Table 4: Summary statistics: Bank characteristics
This table reports summary statistics regarding variables describing the local
banks in Austrian ski resort villages. We report the average equity ratio of
banks operating in a 20 kilometer radius around the ski resorts, both for all
banks (all) and for the subset of regional banks (reg). In each case, we report
separate statistics based on bank-level balance sheet data and on balance sheet
data aggregated at the level of Austria’s banking groups (grp), e.g., the group
of savings banks. The number of banks is defined as the number of distinct
banking groups in a 20 kilometer radius around a ski resort. Branch diversifi-
cation measures the degree of geographic expansion of the branch network of
the “average bank” in a 20 kilometer radius around a ski resort. For formal
definitions of the variables, see Section 4.1.
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs
Bank Equityall .082 .013 .054 .135 3654
Bank Equitygrp,all .079 .008 .067 .1 3654
Bank Equityreg .08 .012 .054 .134 3654
Bank Equitygrp,reg .08 .008 .067 .1 3654
Distinct banksgrp 5.753 2.193 2 11 3654






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Instrumental variables estimates
This table reports results for instrumental variables (IV) regressions explaining the weekly
employment days (ED) of firms in Austrian ski tourism during the years 1998-2006. We
focus on the starting weeks of the skiing season. The dependent variable is defined in
expression (2). We use explanatory variables measuring the expected snow and snow risk in
a resort-week, based on data about the last five skiing seasons. See expression (4) for formal
definitions. Bank Equityreg is defined as the average equity ratio of all regionally active
banks located in a 20 kilometer radius around a ski resort. These banks belong to banking
groups, e.g., the group of savings banks. We use the aggregate equity ratio of a bank’s group
as an instrument, denoted as Bank Equitygrp,reg. All equity ratio variables are de-meaned
and defined in terms of basis points. In parentheses, we report standard errors clustered at
the ski-resort level. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively. The ratio β1/β0 equals the coefficient of the interaction of snow risk and bank
equity divided by the baseline coefficient of snow risk. Below our estimates regarding this
ratio, we report the p-value of tests that it equals zero.
OLS 1st stage results 2nd stage
Log(ED) Bank Equityreg Log(ED)
× Exp. snowt × Snow riskt
Exp. snowt 0.234∗∗∗ -2.472 -11.86∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(0.0480) (4.224) (3.357) (0.0475)
Snow riskt -0.147∗∗∗ -18.74∗∗∗ -10.43∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗
(0.0318) (2.961) (4.171) (0.0360)
Bank Equityreg × Exp. snowt -0.00122∗∗∗ -0.000661
(0.000333) (0.00103)
Bank Equityreg × Snow riskt 0.000702∗∗∗ 0.00142∗∗
(0.000251) (0.000638)
Bank Equitygrp,reg × Exp. snowt 0.623∗∗∗ -0.0177
(0.0570) (0.0619)
Bank Equitygrp,reg × Snow riskt -0.0137 0.555∗∗∗
(0.0478) (0.0712)
N 325096 325096 325096 325096
R2 0.168 0.167
Firm-Season FE YES YES YES YES
Week FE YES YES YES YES
β1/β0 -0.00 -0.01
P-Value 0.03 0.05
F-Test of excluded instruments 123.32 73.87
Angrist-Pieschke F-Test 133.14 64.49
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.09
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Table 9: Horse race: Bank equity vs. number of banks
This table reports results for regressions explaining the weekly employment days of tem-
porary workers of hotels in Austrian ski resorts during the years 1998-2006. We focus on
the starting weeks of the skiing season. The dependent variable is defined in expression (2).
We use explanatory variables measuring the expected snow and snow risk in a resort-week,
based on data about the last five skiing seasons. See expression (4) for formal definitions.
Bank equity is defined as the average equity ratio of all banks located in a 20 kilometer
radius around a ski resort, measured at the level of the banking groups to which the banks
belong, e.g., the group of savings banks. It is de-meaned and defined in terms of basis
points. The number of banks is defined as the number of distinct banking groups in a 20
kilometer radius around a ski resort. In parentheses, we report standard errors clustered at
the ski-resort level. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively.
Log(employment days)
Exp. snowt 0.235∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(0.0497) (0.0468) (0.0467)
Snow riskt -0.126∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗
(0.0324) (0.0312) (0.0310)
Bank Equitygrp,all × Exp. snowt -0.00127∗∗ -0.00153∗∗
(0.000636) (0.000637)
Bank Equitygrp,all × Snow riskt 0.000972∗∗∗ 0.00118∗∗∗
(0.000346) (0.000335)
# of Banks × Exp. snowt -0.0547 -0.0438 -0.0457
(0.0435) (0.0428) (0.0422)
# of Banks × Snow riskt 0.0537∗ 0.0511∗ 0.0583∗∗
(0.0278) (0.0276) (0.0270)
Bank Equitygrp,all × # of Banks × Exp. snowt -0.000623
(0.000619)
Bank Equitygrp,all × # of Banks × Snow riskt 0.00113∗∗∗
(0.000278)
N 325096 325096 325096
R2 0.167 0.168 0.168
Firm-Season FE YES YES YES
Week FE YES YES YES
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Table 10: Horse race: Bank equity vs. bank branch network diver-
sification
This table reports results for regressions explaining the weekly employment days of tem-
porary workers of hotels in Austrian ski resorts during the years 1998-2006. We focus on
the starting weeks of the skiing season. The dependent variable is defined in expression (2).
We use explanatory variables measuring the expected snow and snow risk in a resort-week,
based on data about the last five skiing seasons. See expression (4) for formal definitions.
Bank equity is defined as the average equity ratio of all banks located in a 20 kilometer
radius around a ski resort, measured at the level of the banking groups to which the banks
belong, e.g., the group of savings banks. It is de-meaned and defined in terms of basis points.
Branch diversification measures the degree of geographic expansion of the branch network
of the “average bank” in a 20 kilometer radius around a ski resort. For a formal definition,
see 4.1. In parentheses, we report standard errors clustered at the ski-resort level. *,**,***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Log(employment days)
Exp. snowt 0.240∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.0493) (0.0457) (0.0480)
Snow riskt -0.133∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗
(0.0319) (0.0307) (0.0320)
Bank Equitygrp,all × Exp. snowt -0.00106 -0.00117∗
(0.000686) (0.000683)
Bank Equitygrp,all × Snow riskt 0.000718∗∗ 0.000796∗∗
(0.000348) (0.000342)
Branch Diversification × Exp. snowt -0.0853∗∗ -0.0619 -0.0451
(0.0430) (0.0461) (0.0478)
Branch Diversification × Snow riskt 0.0929∗∗∗ 0.0785∗∗∗ 0.0560∗
(0.0269) (0.0271) (0.0301)
Bank Equitygrp,all × Branch Diversification × Exp. snowt -0.000726
(0.000609)
Bank Equitygrp,all × Branch Diversification × Snow riskt 0.00113∗∗∗
(0.000341)
N 325096 325096 325096
R2 0.168 0.168 0.168
Firm-Season FE YES YES YES
Week FE YES YES YES
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Table 11: Horse race: Bank equity vs. liquidity creation
This table reports results for regressions explaining the weekly employment days of tempo-
rary workers of hotels in Austrian ski resorts during the years 1998-2006. We focus on the
starting weeks of the skiing season. The dependent variable is defined in expression (2). We
use explanatory variables measuring the expected snow and snow risk in a resort-week, based
on data about the last five skiing seasons. See expression (4) for formal definitions. Bank
equity is defined as the average equity ratio of all banks located in a 20 kilometer radius
around a ski resort, measured at the level of the banking groups to which the banks belong,
e.g., the group of savings banks. It is de-meaned and defined in terms of basis points. We
use the definition of Berger and Bouwman (2009) to define the liquidity creation capacity,
LCC, as the weighted sum of liquid and illiquid assets and liabilities. We scale LCC by total
assets and calculate the average of all banks in a 20 kilometer radius around a ski resort.
In parentheses, we report standard errors clustered at the ski-resort level. *,**,*** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Log(employment days)
Exp. snowt 0.299∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.0524) (0.0464) (0.0529)
Snow riskt -0.152∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
(0.0352) (0.0336) (0.0402)
Bank Equitygrp,all × Exp. snowt -0.00605∗∗∗ -0.00591∗∗∗
(0.000865) (0.000847)
Bank Equitygrp,all × Snow riskt 0.00128∗∗ 0.00110∗
(0.000626) (0.000624)
LCC/TAgrp,all × Exp. snowt 0.280∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗
(0.0458) (0.0603) (0.0593)
LCC/TAgrp,all × Snow riskt -0.0196 -0.0731 -0.0681
(0.0349) (0.0496) (0.0481)
Bank Equitygrp,all × LCC/TAgrp,all × Exp. snowt -0.00144∗∗
(0.000664)
Bank Equitygrp,all × LCC/TAgrp,all × Snow riskt 0.00110∗∗∗
(0.000402)
N 325096 325096 325096
R2 0.172 0.179 0.179
Firm-Season FE YES YES YES
Week FE YES YES YES
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Table 12: Risk sharing and labor market tightness. Early season
This table reports results for regressions explaining the weekly employment days of
temporary workers of hotels in Austrian ski resorts during the years 1998-2006. We
focus on the starting weeks of the skiing season. The dependent variable is defined
in expression (2). We use explanatory variables based on information about snow
conditions known before the start of a season, and variables describing within-season
variation in the snow conditions. The former variables are based on data about the
last five skiing seasons and measure the expected snow conditions and snow risk in a
ski resort-week. See expression (4) for formal definitions. Snowt denotes a dummy
variable indicating whether there was enough snow for skiing during a resort-week.
Bank equity is defined as the average equity ratio of all banks located in a 20 kilometer
radius around a ski resort, measured at the level of the banking groups to which the
banks belong, e.g., the group of savings banks. It is de-meaned and defined in terms
of basis points. We split our sample into two subgroups according to the labor market
tightness of the county in which the firm operates. The labor market tightness is defined
as (1 − unemployment ratec(i),T ) in county c(i) and year T . In parentheses, we report
standard errors clustered at the ski-resort level. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Log(employment days)
High LMT Low LMT
Within-season
Snowt − Exp. snowt -0.0233 -0.0283 0.0642∗∗∗ 0.0653∗∗∗
(0.0314) (0.0312) (0.0243) (0.0234)
Ex-ante
Exp. snowt 0.178∗∗ 0.113 0.297∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗
(0.0821) (0.0781) (0.0607) (0.0622)
Snow riskt -0.134∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.0840∗∗ -0.0802∗∗
(0.0465) (0.0443) (0.0389) (0.0404)
Bank Equitygrp,all × Exp. snowt -0.00221∗∗∗ 0.00131
(0.000810) (0.000910)
Bank Equitygrp,all × Snow riskt 0.000943∗ 0.000178
(0.000513) (0.000480)
N 154456 154456 166824 166824
R2 0.202 0.204 0.140 0.140
Firm-Season FE YES YES YES YES
Week FE YES YES YES YES
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